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Abstract 
The Trump Administration’s implementation of its America First Energy Plan, whose 
goal is achieving U.S. “energy dominance,” has relied heavily upon public mineral development. 
Mineral development on federal lands is largely governed by statute. The statutory legal 
mechanisms by which the Executive Branch can “open” or “close” an area of federal lands to 
mineral development, whether onshore or offshore, are withdrawal, modification, and 
revocation. 
 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act (OCSLA) are the primary statutes that govern onshore and offshore mineral 
development on over 2 billion acres of federal lands. Both FLPMA and OCSLA authorize 
withdrawals, which the Executive can use to place federal lands off limits to mineral 
development. FLPMA also authorizes modifications and revocations, which can remove 
constraints on such development. The Trump Administration has relied on both statutes in its 
quest to expand the areas that are available for private mineral disposition through modification 
or revocation of withdrawals by prior administrations.  
 
The authority provided by FLPMA and OCSLA to determine the availability of federal 
lands for mineral development is subject to a series of substantive and procedural constraints. 
Because it regards those constraints as undesirable shackles on the implementation of its mineral 
development policies, and consistent with its expansive view of Executive Branch power in 
almost all contexts, the Administration has not been content to rely on statutory authorization to 
modify and revoke development-precluding withdrawals. Instead, it has also invoked 
nonstatutory, implied or inherent authority to open vast areas of federal lands to oil and gas, coal, 
and other mineral development.  
 
The paucity of judicial precedent governing the parameters of statutory and nonstatutory 
Executive Branch authority to reopen lands previously placed off limits to mineral development 
raises significant questions about the legality of the Administration’s efforts to alter the status of 
protected lands and resources. Although the Administration apparently regards downsizing or 
revocation of withdrawals by previous administrations as a quick and effective way to open up 
vast new acreage to mineral development, the legal basis for its actions is tenuous at best. 
 
This Article examines both statutory and nonstatutory mechanisms for determining the 
availability of federal onshore and offshore lands for uses such as mineral exploration and 
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development. It identifies the constraints that FLPMA and OCSLA impose on revocation or 
modification of previous withdrawals. It also explores the parameters of nonstatutory Executive 
mineral disposition authority and assesses the legality of the significant Trump Administration 
withdrawal modification and revocation efforts to date. It concludes that Congress has eliminated 
any implied or inherent withdrawal, revocation, or modification authority that may once have 
existed. It also finds that the most prominent and controversial of the Trump withdrawal 
modifications and revocations exceeded the authority the Executive Branch retains under 
FLPMA and OCSLA. As a result, that the Trump Administration’s unauthorized pursuit of 




I. The History of Withdrawals and Revocations Prior to OCSLA and FLPMA 
A. 1800-1900:  Acquisition, Disposal, and the Pursuit of Manifest Destiny 
B. 1900-1950:  Transitioning into Retention and Conservation, and Growing 
Questions About Withdrawal and Revocation Authority 
II. Congressional attempts to Organize the Chaos:  the Legislative History of the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
A. Offshore Public Mineral Development and OCSLA 
1. The Origins of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
2. OCSLA’s Limited Delegation of Presidential Withdrawal Authority 
B. Onshore Public Mineral Development and FLPMA 
1. FLPMA’s Legislative History – the Public Lands Law Commission 
Report 
2. FLPMA’s Limited Delegation of Secretarial Withdrawal, Modification 
and Revocation Authority 
III. Chaos Further Resolved:  The Demise of the Nonstatutory Presidential Practice of 
Making, Modifying or Revoking Prior Withdrawals and Congress’s Limited 
Delegations of Authority in OCSLA and FLPMA 
A. Nonstatutory Presidential Revocations on Federal Lands:  A Relic of the Past 
B. What Remains:  Limited Executive Branch Authority to Make, Modify, or 
Revoke Withdrawals of Federal Lands Under OCSLA and FLPMA 
Conclusion 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678312
Draft:  Please do not cite without authors’ permission 





The Trump Administration’s energy legacy has included numerous steps to revoke, 
curtail, or alter the actions of previous administrations withdrawing areas of federally owned 
land from exploration and development of minerals, particularly oil, gas, and coal. The Trump 
Administration made its zeal for achieving what it later dubbed a quest for “energy dominance”1 
clear almost immediately after President Trump took office in January 2017. In March of that 
year, the President issued an executive order requiring all federal agencies to review actions that 
“potentially burden the development or use of domestically produced energy resources,” 
particularly fossil fuel and nuclear energy resources.”2 The order also directed the Secretary of 
the Interior to “lift any and all moratoria on Federal land coal leasing activities.”3 This portion of 
the order was the Trump Administration’s response to an Obama-era Secretarial order halting 
review of new applications for federal coal leases pending the preparation of a programmatic 
environmental impact statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).4 
Within days, Trump’s first Secretary of Interior, Ryan Zinke, revoked the Obama Secretarial 
order, finding that “the public interest is not served by halting the Federal coal program for an 
extended time, nor is a [programmatic EIS] required to consider potential improvements to the 
 
1 See White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump Is Unleashing American Energy Dominance, May 14, 
2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-unleashing-american-energy-
dominance/; Justin Worland, President Trump Says He Wants 'Energy Dominance.' What Does He Mean?, TIME, 
June 30, 2017, https://time.com/4839884/energy-dominance-energy-independence-donald-trump/ (noting that 
President Trump’s “energy dominance” agenda included “a slew of initiatives aimed at speeding up production of 
oil, natural gas and coal . . . . Trump has described his policies as a dramatic shift in direction from the Obama years, 
[which he] described . . . as ‘eight years of hell’ that included ‘massive job-killing barriers to American energy 
development.’”). 
2 Exec. Order No. 13783, Presidential Executive Order in Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 
§§ 2(a) & (b), 82 Fed. Reg. 16093, 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017). The Order defined burden to mean “unnecessarily 
obstruct, delay, curtail, or otherwise impose significant costs on the siting, permitting, production, utilization, 
transmission, or delivery of energy resources.” Id. § 2(b). 
3 Id. § 6, 82 Fed. Reg. 16096. 
4 Secretarial Order No. 3338, Discretionary Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement to Modernize the 
Federal Coal Program §§ 4, 5a (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/assets/2016/01/15/document_gw_04.pdf. 
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program.”5 Zinke directed the Interior Department’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM) “to 
process coal lease applications and modifications expeditiously.”6 Two months later, Secretary 
of Energy Rick Perry, during the Administration’s self-described “Energy Week,” singled out the 
Obama Administration’s “hostility towards coal” as the most important factor in the coal 
industry’s falling fortunes.7 
Shifting his attention to offshore resources, in April 2017, President Trump initiated an 
effort to open up submerged lands off the coast of Alaska and in the North Atlantic, which had 
been withdrawn from oil and gas development by President Obama, using the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).8 In another executive order, Trump announced a policy of 
“encourag[ing] energy exploration and production, including on the Outer Continental Shelf, in 
order to maintain the nation’s position as a global energy leader and foster energy security and 
resilience.”9 The order directed the Interior Secretary to consider revising the schedule of 
proposed oil and gas lease sales so that it included annual lease sales “to the maximum extent 
permitted by law.”10 The President also ordered the Secretary of Commerce to refrain from 
 
5 Secretarial Order No. 3348, § 4, Concerning the Federal Coal Moratorium (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/so_3348_coal_moratorium.pdf. This order was challenged 
unsuccessfully.  See Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, No. CV-17-30-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 
2615527 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020); Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 384 F. Supp. 3d 1264 (D. 
Mont. 2019). The district court indicated, however, that “Plaintiffs remain free to file a complaint to challenge the 
sufficiency of the EA and FONSI and the issuance of any individual coal leases.” Citizens for Clean Energy v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, No. CV-17-30-GF-BMM, 2020 WL 2615527, at *9 (D. Mont. May 22, 2020). 
6 Secretarial Order No. 3348, § 5. 
7 Krysti Shallenberger, Energy Week: Perry Touts All-of-the-Above Strategy in Push for ‘Energy Dominance’, 
UTILITY DIVE, June 28, 2019, https://www.utilitydive.com/news/energy-week-perry-touts-all-of-the-above-strategy-
in-push-for-energy-domi/446052/ (quoting Secretary Perry’s assertion that “[t]hese politically-driven policies driven 
by a hostility to coal threatens [sic] the reliability and stability of the greatest electrical grid in the world”). 
8 Sabrina Shankman, Trump Moves to Lift Offshore Arctic Drilling Ban, But It Might Not Be So Easy, INSIDE 
CLIMATE NEWS, Apr. 28, 2017, https://insideclimatenews.org/news/28042017/doanld-trump-arctic-offshore-drilling-
ban-obama-executive-order; Coral Davenport, Obama Bans Drilling in Parts of the Atlantic and the Arctic, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/20/us/obama-drilling-ban-arctic-atlantic.html. 
9 Exec. Order No. 13795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, §§ 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815, 
20815 (May 3, 2017). 
10 Id. § 3(a). 
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designating or expanding National Marine Sanctuaries and to review all designations of those 
Sanctuaries and of marine national monuments under the Antiquities Act of 1906 to assess, 
among other criteria, “the opportunity costs associated with potential energy and mineral 
exploration and production” inside the previously protected marine monuments.11 With alacrity, 
Interior Secretary Zinke issued an order to implement the “America-First Offshore Energy 
Strategy,”12 which directed the Interior Department’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM) to “[i]mmediately initiate development” of a new five-year leasing program.”13  
The Administration also quickly took other actions to remove constraints on energy 
development put in place by previous administrations. In the same month that he sought to 
accelerate offshore oil and gas exploration, President Trump issued an executive order directing 
the Interior Secretary to conduct a review of all presidential designations or expansions of 
national monuments under the Antiquities Act since January 1996, “where the designation after 
expansion covers more than 100,000 acres, or where the Secretary determines that the 
designation or expansion was made without adequate public outreach and coordination with 
relevant stakeholders and the effects on surrounding lands and communities.”14 The ostensible 
purpose of the review was to assess whether these designations or expansions conform to the 
executive order’s pronouncement that “[d]esignations should be made in accordance with the 
requirements and original objectives of the [Antiquities] Act and appropriately balance the 
protection of landmarks, structures, and objects against the appropriate use of Federal lands and 
 
11 Id. § 4(a)-(b). The Antiquities Act is codified at 54 U.S.C. §§ 32301-32303. 
12 Secretarial Order No. 3350, America -First Offshore Energy Strategy (May 1, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/press-release/secretarial-order-3350.pdf.  
13 Id. § 4a(1). 
14 Exec. Order No. 13792, Review of Designations Under the Antiquities Act, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 20429, 20429 (May 
1, 2017). 
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the effects on surrounding lands and communities.”15 The order singled out the Bears Ears 
National Monument,16 which President Obama had reserved and withdrawn from mineral entry, 
location, sale, new leasing, or other disposition,17 requiring the Secretary to provide an interim 
report to the President and other administration officials containing recommendations on the 
future fate of that monument.18 
Six weeks later, Secretary Zinke issued his interim report recommending modification of 
the boundaries of Bears Ears.19  President Trump followed Zinke’s recommendation and signed a 
proclamation “modifying” Bears Ears in December 2017.20 In the Proclamation, President 
Trump declared “it is in the public interest to modify the boundaries of the monument to exclude 
from its designation and reservation approximately 1,150,860 acres of land that I find are 
unnecessary for the care and management of the objects to be protected within the monument.”21 
He therefore proclaimed that “the boundaries of the Bears Ears National Monument are hereby 
modified and reduced” accordingly.22 Further, he proclaimed that lands excluded from the 
monument pursuant to the Proclamation would be open to “(1) entry, location, selection, sale, or 
other disposition under the public land laws and laws applicable to the U.S. Forest Service; (2) 
 
15 Id. § 1. 
16 Id. § 2(d), 82 Fed. Reg. at 20430.  
17 Presidential Proclamation 9558, Establishment of the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 1139 (Dec. 
28, 2016).  For a discussion of the history leading up to President Obama’s establishment of the Bears Ears National 
Monument, see Sarah Krakoff, Public Lands, Conservation, and the Possibility of Justice, 53 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS.-
CIV. LIB. L. REV. 213, 214 (2018).  
18 Exec. Order No. 13792, supra note 14, § 2(d). 
19 Interim Report Pursuant to Executive Order 13792 (June 10, 2017), 
https://www.scribd.com/document/351066813/Interim-Report-EO-13792. 
20 Presidential Proclamation 9681, Modifying the Bears Ears National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 58081 (Dec. 8, 
2017). 
21 Id. at 58085. 
22 Id. 
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disposition under all laws relating to mineral and geothermal leasing; and (3) location, entry, and 
patent under the mining laws.”23 
On the same day that he reduced Bears Ears, President Trump issued another 
proclamation modifying the boundaries of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 
established by President Bill Clinton in 1996.24 Like the Bears Ears proclamation, Clinton’s 
Grand Staircase-Escalante designation had withdrawn all lands within that monument to mineral 
development, preventing the development of a massive coal mine by Andalex Resources.25 In an 
attempt to remove what he saw as a barrier to development of the coal Andalex had pursued two 
decades earlier, President Trump declared it to be “in the public interest to modify the boundary 
of the monument to exclude from its designation and reservation approximately 861,974 acres of 
land that I find are no longer necessary for the proper care and management of the objects to be 
protected within the monument.”26 The Trump proclamation declared the newly excluded lands 
open to mineral entry and disposition, and reopened to mineral development several areas that 
hold some of the largest coal deposits in the western hemisphere.27 Trump’s two 2017 
proclamations shrunk Bears Ears by about eighty-five percent and Grand Staircase by about half, 
 
23 Id. 
24 Presidential Proclamation 6920, Establishment of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 50223 (Sept. 18, 1996). 
25 Id. Clinton’s proclamation stated that:  
[a]ll Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of this monument are hereby 
appropriated and withdrawn from entry, location, selection, sale, leasing, or other disposition 
under the public land laws, other than by exchange that furthers the protective purposes of the 
monument. Lands and interests in lands not owned by the United States shall be reserved as a part 
of the monument upon acquisition of title thereto by the United States. 
Id. at 50225. See also Juliet Eilperin, A Diminished Monument, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/environment/will-anyone-mine-after-grand-staircase-
escalante-reduction-by-trump/. 
26 Presidential Proclamation 6982, Modifying the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, 82 Fed. Reg. 
58089, 58093 (Dec. 8, 2017). 
27 Id. The Clinton Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument was estimated to hold 62 billion tons of coal. 
Jennifer Yachnin, Administration Pushed to Save Coal Deposits, E&E NEWS, Mar. 14, 2019, https://www-eenews-
net.gwlaw.idm.oclc.org/eedaily/2019/03/14/stories/1060127237.  
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revoking withdrawals covering approximately 1.8 million acres.28 Once the revised monument 
management plans were finalized in February of 2020, it became quite clear that the 
Administration’s motives were to open up previously protected monument lands for oil and gas, 
uranium, and coal development, along with other previously prohibited activities like high 
impact off-road vehicle use.29  
Former Secretary Zinke and his successor, David Bernhardt, have followed the 
President’s lead in expanding private access to energy resources on lands owned or controlled by 
the federal government at the agency level as well.  In doing so, they have increased the rate of 
oil and gas leasing and federal mineral exploitation since 2017, opening 1.6 million acres of land 
in the western United States to oil and gas leasing in 2017, and another 2.1 million acres in 
2018.30 In total, the Trump Administration removed protections on nearly 13.5 million acres of 
onshore federal public lands in little more than three years, and by April of 2020, the 
 
28 Coral Davenport, Trump Opens National Monument Land to Energy Exploration, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/climate/trump-grand-staircase-monument.html; Julie Turkewitz, Trump 
Slashes Size of Bears Ears and Grand Staircase Monuments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/trump-bears-ears.html. For maps showing the original and redrawn 
boundaries of the two monuments, see Adam Roy, Map: This Is What Bears Ears Is Losing, BACKPACKER, Dec. 11, 
2017; Points to Make in Your Comments on Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, SOUTHERN UTAH 
WILDERNESS ALLIANCE, https://suwa.org/points-make-comments-grand-staircase-escalante-national-monument/ 
(last visited June 8, 2020). 
29 See BLM Record of Decision and Approved Monument Management Plans for Bears Ears National Monument 
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/projects/lup/94460/20012455/250017011/BLM_ROD_and_Approved_MMPs_for_the_Indian_Creek_and_Sh
ash_Jaa_Units_of_BENM_February2020.pdf; BLM Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument & Kanab-
Escalante Planning Area Resource Management Plans (Feb. 6, 2020), https://eplanning.blm.gov/epl-front-
office/eplanning/planAndProjectSite.do?methodName=dispatchToPatternPage&currentPageId=141292. 
30 Kyla Mandel, Lack of Demand Hasn’t Stopped Trump from Opening Tons of Land to Oil and Gas Drilling, 
THINKPROGRESS, Apr. 12, 2019, https://thinkprogress.org/trump-interior-oil-gas-drilling/. The 2018 amounts were 
four times the amounts made available for leasing in the final year of the Obama Administration. Id.; Ctr. for W. 
Priorities, The Oil and Gas Leasing Process on U.S. Public Lands, https://westernpriorities.org/issues/drilling-on-
public-lands/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2020). 
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Administration had offered more than 24 million acres of onshore federal land for oil and gas 
development.31  
The federal lands, including offshore submerged lands, have been critical to 
implementing the goals of Trump’s America First Energy Plan, which involves extensive 
mineral development of all types.32 The Plan primarily focuses on oil, natural gas, and coal, 
although the Administration has paved the way for increased uranium mining and milling in the 
southwest and also increased mining operations for rare-earth minerals like lithium, which are 
essential for the development of new energy technologies.33 However, the Trump 
Administration’s somewhat freewheeling approach to opening federal lands to mineral 
development and encouraging or unburdening the development of these resources has called into 
question the precise legal basis for its actions.34 Courts have resolved some of these questions in 
recent legal challenges, as indicated below.35 The larger matter of how and to what degree the 
Executive Branch can open federal lands to mineral extraction, however, is fairly clearly 
 
31 Jenny Rowland-Shea & Maryellen Kustin, A 13.5 Million Acre Lie, CTR. FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, Mar. 20, 
2019, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2019/03/20/467548/13-5-million-acre-lie/.  
32 White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump is Ending the War on American Energy and Delivering a 
New Era of Energy Dominance (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-
j-trump-ending-war-american-energy-delivering-new-era-energy-dominance/. 
33 Rowland-Shea & Kustin, supra note 31 (“Numbers for new acres leased and new leases issued during the year 
have continued to increase, up 117 percent for new acres leased during the year and up 156 percent for new leases 
issued since FY 2016.”); Ernest Scheyder, Lithium Americas Moves Closer to Nevada Mine Approval, REUTERS 
(Jan. 20, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mining-lithium-americas/lithium-americas-moves-closer-to-
nevada-mine-approval-idUSKBN1ZJ1WP; U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and 
Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals (June 4, 2019), https://www.commerce.gov/news/reports/2019/06/federal-
strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-minerals; Chris D’Angelo, Fears Mount That Trump Will 
Green-light Uranium Mining Near Grand Canyon, HUFFPOST, June 5, 2019, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/uranium-mining-grand-canyon-ban_n_5cf848cde4b0e63eda953c65. As recently as 
June 2019, the Commerce Department released a strategy calling for faster permitting for mining operations and a 
“thorough review” of all mineral withdrawals on federal lands. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Federal Strategy to 
Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals, June 4, 2019, 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/reports/2019/06/federal-strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-
minerals. 
34 See Exec. Order No. 13783, supra note 2, §§ 2(a) & (b). 
35 See National Mining Ass’n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2016); League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 
363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1031 (D. Alaska 2019); see infra notes 236, 336-337 and accompanying text.  
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delineated in the respective statutes Congress has enacted over the past fifty years regulating 
mineral development on federal lands, which cast doubt on the validity of the Trump 
Administration’s actions.  
Two statutes guide the development of these mineral resources on federal lands in the 
modern era, OCLSA36 and the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA),37 although 
they are somewhat recent additions to the library of public lands laws. Throughout the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth century, Congress passed a multitude of statutes that encouraged 
the use and development of federal lands and resources to help aid western settlement and 
economic development, including mineral-bearing lands.38 At first, the federal policy was to 
convey the surface estate and retain the mineral interest, but in the late nineteenth century, and 
especially after the enactment of the General Mining Law in 1866, and its amendment in 1870 
and 1872,39 disposal of even the mineral-bearing lands for the purpose of mineral development 
became part of the codified federal policy.40  Although many of these statutes have been 
repealed, some of them remain in effect, which complicates the management of federal lands. 
Historically, Congress was willing to allow coastal states to control offshore mineral 
development and the Executive Branch to control disposition of onshore mineral bearing lands, 
but this willingness faded by the mid-century mark.41 In 1953, Congress resolved the questions 
 
36 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356b (2018). 
37 Federal Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787(2018). 
38 Sylvia L. Harrison, Disposition of the Mineral Estate on United States Public Lands: A Historical Perspective, 10 
PUB. LAND L. REV. 131, 141 (1989) (noting that early to mid-nineteenth century “enactments resulted in the 
conveyance of public lands to private individuals and companies, [but] most contained some provision for retention 
of a portion of the public mineral estate for public purposes”). 
39 See 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 2:5 (2d ed. 
2007) (describing the 1872 statute as amending and codifying the two earlier enactments). 
40 Harrison, supra note 38, at 147; see 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, §§ 2:2 to 2:9 (describing the “Age 
of Disposition” between 1787 and 1934). 
41 See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, §§ 2:10 to2:15 (describing the onset of the “Age of Conservation” 
between 1934 and 1964). Congress had begun to limit access to and development of federal lands and resources for 
certain non-mineral uses before mid-century in statutes such as the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 to 
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of offshore ownership and jurisdiction by passing OCSLA, which asserted the federal 
government’s ownership and management authority over mineral resources in the outer 
continental shelf, adding a subsequent declaration of national policy in 1978 that these resources 
be developed consistent with certain “environmental safeguards.”42 In adopting FLPMA in 1976, 
Congress declared the beginning of a new era of onshore federal land management, focused on 
retention of federal lands and more cautious and purposeful management of their varied 
resources, including management requirements that protect the quality of “environmental … 
values.”43  
Together, these two statutes now regulate mineral development on 1.75 billion acres of 
submerged offshore lands (OCSLA) and 700 million acres of onshore federal lands (FLPMA).44 
Although numerous other statutes guide and constrain mineral development in various ways, 
these are the threshold laws that determine which federal lands will be open, or closed, to 
mineral development, and, if closed, whether temporarily or permanently.45 Both OCLSA and 
FLPMA delegate authority to the Executive Branch to withdraw offshore and onshore federal 
lands containing mineral resources from the operation of the statutes that otherwise allow these 
activities, such as the General Mining Law46 and the Mineral Leasing Act.47 OCSCLA does not 
 
315r (ending the use of public lands as an open commons for grazing). See 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 
39, § 2:14. 
42 43 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1341(a). 
43 Id. § 1701(a)(8) (2014).  
44 G. Kevin Jones, Understanding the Debate over Congressionally Imposed Moratoria on Outer Continental Shelf 
Oil and Gas Leasing, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 117, 122 (1990) (discussing scope of Interior Secretary James 
Watt’s opening of nearly all of BOEM submerged lands to oil and gas during first years of Reagan Administration); 
Stefanie L. Burt, Who Owns the Right to Store Gas: A Survey of Pore Space Ownership in U.S. Jurisdictions, 4 
Joule: DUQ. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2016). 
45 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a). 
46 Sess. 2, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91–96 (1872) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).  
47 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (2018). 
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grant the Executive any power to revoke prior offshore withdrawals.48 FLPMA does give the 
Secretary of Interior revocation authority, but the Secretary’s discretion is limited.49 
Recognition of these limits has featured prominently in the limited judicial opinions 
analyzing the scope of Executive revocation authority under FLPMA.50 Thus, while FLPMA 
authorizes the Secretary of Interior to withdraw federal lands containing mineral resources from 
the operation of the mineral development statutes, on a temporary or permanent basis, it also 
limits the Executive’s authority to revoke, modify or otherwise affect previous withdrawals. 
When viewed together with OCSLA’s limited, one-way delegation of authority to withdraw 
offshore mineral-bearing lands from development, it is clear that Congress’s overarching intent 
in crafting these modern federal land and resource management laws was to (1) repeal 
nonstatutory Executive Branch withdrawal, modification, and revocation authority, (2) carefully 
delineate Executive branch authority to reopen federal lands to resource exploitation through 
revocation of previous constraints on development, and (3) codify a preference for federal 
retention of lands and mineral resources, unless Congress has spoken or acted to mandate or 
authorize disposition.51  
This Article examines the FLPMA and OCSLA mechanisms authorizing withdrawal of 
federal onshore and offshore lands and the constraints both statutes impose on revocation or 
 
48 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1031 (D. Alaska 2019). 
49 See 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Sustainable Federal Land Management: Protecting 
Ecological Integrity and Preserving Environmental Principal, 44 TULSA L. REV. 147, 160 (2008) [hereinafter 
Glicksman, Ecological Integrity] (characterizing FLPMA as “a movement away from the tilt toward commodity 
production . . . and toward the protection of environmental values”). 
50 See infra Parts IIB, IIIB. 
51 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a); 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a); see George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, “Nothing Beside 
Remains”: The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt’s Tenure as Secretary of the Interior on Federal Land Law and 
Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 505 (1990) [hereinafter Coggins, Watt]; see also Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 877 (1990) (referring to FLPMA’s public land and resource retention policy); Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n v. Burford, 676 F. Supp. 271 (D.D.C. 1985), reconsideration denied, 676 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1986), 
aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g denied, 844 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1988) (enjoining termination of protective 
classifications and withdrawal revocations on 170 million acres of public lands). 
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modification of such withdrawals. Part I provides a brief history of onshore and offshore 
executive withdrawals and revocations prior to the enactment of OCSLA and FLPMA. Part II 
explores the reasons why Congress chose to circumscribe Executive Branch authority to 
withdraw and revoke prior withdrawals in both areas, drawing on the legislative history, the 
enacted text, and judicial interpretations of both statutes. Part III focuses on the resulting 
parameters of Executive withdrawal authority, concluding that there is no longer any 
nonstatutory withdrawal, revocation, or modification authority after FLPMA, and that OCSLA 
and FLPMA limit Executive Branch authority to make and revoke withdrawals to an extent that 
had been lacking through the first half of the twentieth century. This Part also assesses the 
legality of the Trump Administration’s withdrawal revocation efforts to date, concluding that the 
most prominent and controversial revocations exceeded the authority provided by FLPMA and 
OCSLA.  The judicially recognized constraints discussed in this Part further bolster the 
conclusion that Congress’s preference in the modern area of mineral withdrawals was to allow 
development of these resources only after adequate consideration of environmental values and in 
“close call” situations, for withdrawn lands to remain withdrawn.  Part IV concludes with a 
summary of the limitations on Executive Branch withdrawal, modification, and revocation 
authority under OCSLA and FLPMA and of how the Trump Administration’s missteps in this 
area have made the road to energy dominance quite rocky indeed.  
 
I.  THE HISTORY OF WITHDRAWALS AND REVOCATIONS PRIOR TO OCSLA AND FLPMA  
 
 
Before Congress organized the system of offshore and onshore withdrawals and 
revocations in OCSLA and FLPMA, the United States had experienced nearly two hundred years 
of rapid expansion and economic growth, spurred in large part by the federal government’s laws 
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and policies that encouraged settlement and development of natural resources on federal lands.52 
Many of these early laws were enacted pursuant to the Constitution’s Property Clause, which 
gives Congress the power to “dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting” 
federal property.53 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Congress used this power 
liberally to enact statutes that encouraged private development of federal lands and natural 
resources, and even provided for processes by which states, railroads, corporations, and 
individuals could obtain title to federal lands and resources, like timber, minerals, and water.54 
Congress authorized development of onshore lands and natural resources in statutes that included 
the Preemption Act,55 the General Mining Law,56 the Homestead Act,57 the Desert Lands Act,58 
and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act.59 The basic mechanism of each disposal-era statute was 
the promise of a private right in federal lands or natural resources in exchange for the effort 
involved in extracting or using the resource, for a modest (or sometimes nonexistent) fee,60 based 
on Congress’s assumption that the development it hoped these give-aways would spur would be 
of great value to the rapidly expanding nation.61 In a similar vein, Congress also disposed of 
 
52 GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 108 (7th ed. 2014). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
54 See, e.g. Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 528 (1897) (discussing statutes permitting grazing and 
privatization of water rights on federal lands); see COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 45-46, 108 (discussing land 
grants to individuals, states, railroads, and other corporations); see also Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law 
Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2005). 
55 General Preemption Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 453.  
56 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-47. 
57 43 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (repealed by Pub. L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (Oct. 21, 1976)). 
58 Id. §§ 321-339 (partially repealed by Pub. L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (Oct. 21, 1976)). 
59 Id. §§ 291-301 (repealed by Pub. L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787 (Oct. 21, 1976)).  
60 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 91 (stating that the federal government disposed of land to private parties 
“in order to spur economic and social development of the nation”); 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 2.5 
(“The main purpose of the [General] Mining Law was to promote mineral development.”); Keiter, supra note 54, at 
1132 (“Congress employed the Homestead Act of 1862, the Desert Lands Act of 1877, the General Mining Law of 
1872, and other such laws to attract prospective settlers and entrepreneurs to the western frontier with the enticement 
of virtually free land and minerals.”). 
61 See Keiter, supra note 54, at 1132 (“Driven by the prevailing national commitment to laissez-faire capitalism, 
federal policy viewed private ownership and initiative as an essential element of social progress.”). 
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federal lands and mineral rights to newly admitted states to fund transportation projects and 
public schools, to railroad companies in an effort to facilitate the construction of transcontinental 
rail lines, and to fund the construction of dams and other reclamation projects that further aided 
western settlement and expansion.62  The chronological evolution of federal lands policy from 
1800-1900 therefore provides a rough framework within which to analyze early withdrawals and 
revocations.  In that period, the federal government was largely engaged in acquisition of lands 
from foreign governments and Indian tribes, and the disposition of the newly acquired lands to 
states, railroads, private corporations, and individuals.63 As of the turn of the twentieth century, 
federal lands policy began to tilt away from wholesale disposition and toward a period of 
disposal and retention.64 The following sections trace the use of the withdrawal and revocation 
mechanisms during those respective periods.   
A.  1800-1900:  Acquisition, Disposal, and the Pursuit of Manifest Destiny 
As noted above, the period from 1800-1900 is largely characterized as one of acquisition 
and disposal, in which Congress and the Executive Branch encouraged expansion of the nation’s 
physical footprint through disposal of land, timber, minerals, water, and other resources for use 
by states, private corporations, and individuals.65  Yet, despite the prevailing federal policy of 
disposition, not every land and resource management decision in the nation’s early years 
reflected the federal government’s inclination to shed federal lands and resources. Rather, 
Congress exercised the disposal and retention powers concurrently, even during times of rapid 
 
62 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 45, 97. 
63 Id.; David H. Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw Lands, 22 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 279, 281 (1982).  
64 Getches, supra note 63, at 283-84. 
65 See COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 91; 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 2.5; Keiter, supra note 54, 
at 1132. 
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development.66 In the first half of the nineteenth century, Congress sought to retain some federal 
lands and important natural resources, usually as military reserves or Indian reservations, even as 
it authorized the privatization of others through the statutory mechanisms of the Preemption Act, 
the Homestead Acts, the railroad and state land grants, and others.67  
The first congressional withdrawals, which occurred in the early 1800s, were onshore, as 
Congress sought to set aside lands for Indian tribes and the military.68 The Executive Branch also 
made onshore withdrawals during this period, for similar reasons. International maritime laws 
and treaties governed offshore submerged lands, and in its landmark 1845 decision, Pollard v. 
Hagan, the Supreme Court recognized state control of the tidal lands under Mobile Bay as an 
incident of Alabama’s sovereignty.69 Tensions over offshore withdrawals would not come to a 
head until later, when the capability to develop offshore oil reserves arose.  
Onshore, the pace at which settlers, corporations, and railroads moved westward was 
rapid, spurred by notions such as Manifest Destiny and the desire to prove to the world that the 
United States was a true player on the international stage.70 Withdrawals were necessary during 
 
66 Congress used the retention power early in the nation’s history, for example, to establish reservations for Indian 
tribes, whose removal from what became federal lands was essential to ensuring the success of the federal expansion 
policies of the nineteenth century. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909). 
67 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 17-18. Professors Coggins and Glicksman describe an “age of disposition” 
running from 1787-1934 and an “age of conservation” spanning 1872 to 1964. As the dates indicate, these were 
“nonexclusive, overlapping historic eras.” 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 2:1. They characterize the 
period from 1964 to the present as the “age of preservation.” Id. § 2:16. See also Robert L. Glicksman & George 
Cameron Coggins, Federal Recreational Land Policy: The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund, 9 COLUM. L. ENVTL. L. 125, 128 (1984) (“Only gradually did a policy of federal land retention, characterized 
by conservation-oriented management, overcome the contrary, longstanding policy to dispose of all federal lands. 
The retention policy has now prevailed for over half a century.”). The Trump Administration’s quest for “energy 
dominance” has moved management of federal lands and resources markedly back toward disposition, to a greater 
extent than at any time since at least the first term of the Reagan Administration. For discussion of the Reagan 
Administration’s disposition policies, see generally Coggins & Nagel, Watt, supra note 51. 
68 Getches, supra note 63, at 283. 
69 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 215–16 (1845) (“A right to the shore between high and low water-mark is a 
sovereign [state] right.”). 
70 See Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings and the Preservation of Indian Country in the 21st 
Century, 38 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 15, 34 (2017) (discussing role of Manifest Destiny in federal 
government’s “empire-building” process). 
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this period for various reasons, but the concurrent exercise of withdrawal authority by the 
Executive Branch and Congress during the nineteenth century raised questions about the 
Executive Branch’s power to reverse a withdrawal as early as the 1860s.71  For instance, on 
November 8, 1862, Attorney General Edward Bates, addressing the issue of whether President 
Abraham Lincoln had the power to return lands within Fort Armstrong in Rock Island, Illinois, 
to “the body of the public lands,” concluded that he did not.72 Bates reasoned that the President 
“derived his authority to appropriate this land ... not from any power over the public land 
inherent in his office, but from an express grant of power from Congress.”73 Although the 
President clearly had the authority, vested by statute, to withdraw lands for military facilities and 
authorize uses of those lands for military purposes, Bates surmised that he “had no power to take 
them out of the class of reserved lands, and restore them to the general body of public lands.”74 
The authority to revoke a prior withdrawal was lacking because “[i]t is certain that no such 
power is conferred on the President in the act under which the selection of a site for Fort 
Armstrong was made.”75 
When questions continued to arise on this matter, Bates’ successors shared his view that 
the Executive Branch lacked inherent authority to revoke prior withdrawals of federal lands.76 In 
1881, President James A. Garfield’s Attorney General, Wayne MacVeagh, was asked to analyze 
a proposed revocation at Fort Fetterman in the Wyoming Territory.77 The precise question put to 
MacVeagh was whether a president may revoke a predecessor’s prior reservation of lands for 
 
71 Kevin O. Leske, “Un-Shelfing” Lands Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA): Can A Prior 
Executive Withdrawal Under Section 12(a) Be Trumped by A Subsequent President?, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 32–
33 (2017). 
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 33-34. 
77 Id. at 34.  
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military purposes and “’restore the lands to the public domain.’”78 MacVeagh concluded that he 
did not, because when the president withdraws land from mineral disposition, the affected land 
“’becomes severed from the mass of public lands and appropriated to a particular public use by 
authority of Congress, which alone can authorize such disposition of the public domain.’”79 
Complicating matters somewhat was the fact that the Executive Branch and Congress 
were each exercising withdrawal authority.  Congress’s first major withdrawal for conservation 
purposes was the creation of Yellowstone National Park in 1872.80 In the late nineteenth century, 
Congress began to codify other more permanent withdrawals, and other permanent forms of 
protection, for certain lands and resources, starting with onshore areas that were deemed to be of 
too great a value to the nation to allow them to be privately owned or developed.81 In 1891, 
Congress passed the General Revision Act, which gave the Executive Branch the authority to 
create forest reserves.82 Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Forest Service Organic Act, 
which established an agency to manage and conserve the forest reserves, and mandated that it 
organize the practice of timber harvesting on the newly established forest units.83 The Organic 
Act also delegated to the President the authority to “revoke, modify, or suspend any and all 
Executive orders and proclamations” issued under section 471 of the Act, “from time to time as 
he shall deem best for the public interests.”84  
 
78 Id. (quoting Military Reservation at Fort Fetterman, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 168 (1881)). 
79 Id. (quoting Military Reservation at Fort Fetterman, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 168 (1881)).  
80 Raymond A. Peck, Jr., And Then There Were None: Evolving Federal Restraints on the Availability of Public 
Lands for Mineral Development, 25 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.-INST. 3 (1979).  
81 COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 108 (discussing how demographic changes and “growing recognition of the 
shortcomings of public land disposal policy . . . contributed to the rise of a powerful national conservation 
movement that would significantly limit, and eventually replace, disposal policy”). The exempted lands included 
Indian Reservations, which became permanent homelands for hundreds of tribes after the treaty making period 
ended in 1871. See Hillary M. Hoffmann, Congressional Plenary Power and Indigenous Environmental 
Stewardship: The Limits of Environmental Federalism, 97 OR. L. REV. 353, 362-63 (2019). 
82 Ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (1891); Getches, supra note 63, at 291. 
83 16 U.S.C. §§ 471-546. 
84 Id. § 473. 
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 Generally speaking, the powers of reservation and withdrawal allowed Congress and the 
Executive Branch to implement temporary or permanent legal prohibitions on privatization of 
lands and individual resources.85 The withdrawals, which were temporary or permanent,86 
removed the affected lands from the operation of the disposal and development laws, thus 
preventing activities such as homesteading or the acquisition of water or mineral rights in the 
withdrawn area.87 When withdrawn lands were also reserved, sometimes simultaneously with the 
withdrawal, their use was limited to affirmative purposes described in the reserving document. 
Often, that purpose was to conserve the named resource for a specific future use.88 Withdrawals 
served varied purposes.89 Congress permanently withdrew certain lands by statute to create 
national parks, military reserves, and Indian reservations.90 Presidents also used executive order 
withdrawals to create or enlarge Indian reservations, military reservations, and bird reserves.91 
During the disposal period, in which federal lands and resources (onshore and offshore) were 
largely open for the taking, the Executive Branch used the mechanism of withdrawal to impede 
wholesale divestiture or complete privatization of certain federal resources, which was especially 
 
85 Robert L. Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 9-10 
(1984) [hereinafter Glicksman, Severability]; Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 467 (noting that President Taft’s 1909 
proclamation restricting the disposition of petroleum deposits on federal lands in California and Wyoming was 
temporary). 
86 Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 9-10. 
87 Id. 
88 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 470-71; see also Getches, supra note 63, at 279.  In Getches’ view:  
Withdrawal remains an important device in federal land use planning and management. 
Significant fragile wildlife habitat may need protection from mining pending consideration of 
legislation to designate it as a park or wildlife refuge. Lands rich in petroleum or oil shale may be 
removed from operation by statutes that would allow private uses and development because they 
can be developed most efficiently under a coordinated national program. Wild areas may be 
protected from commercial uses so that they may remain in their pristine state. Today, public land 
managers may have several ways to accomplish their desired results. Yet one of the most effective 
means is withdrawal. 
Id.  
89 Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 9-10.  
90 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 469-70 (citing Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. 363 (1867); Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 769 
(1879); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 255 (1913)).  
91 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 470. 
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effective because the Executive Branch could make a withdrawal much more expediently than 
Congress.92  
As the twentieth century drew near, Congress and the Executive Branch accelerated the 
pace of withdrawals.93 President Theodore Roosevelt has been lauded as the first champion of 
the Executive withdrawal effort, starting with his onshore withdrawals creating forest reserves in 
1891.94  As discussed below, other Presidents followed suit, withdrawing onshore lands for a 
variety of purposes, including as wildlife refuges, sources of clean water for consumptive use, 
national monuments, and as national oil reserves to support the U.S. economy’s increasing 
dependence on oil.95   Meanwhile, Congress continued its own practice of making withdrawals, 
and began delegating authority to the Executive Branch to make withdrawals in specific 
circumstances.96  
B.  1900-1950:  Transitioning into Retention and Conservation, and Growing Questions 
About Withdrawal and Revocation Authority.  
 
Onshore withdrawals continued during the period from 1900-1950s, but Congress 
asserted its Property Clause authority to organize withdrawals (and revocations, to a lesser 
degree) more during this time than before.97 Conflict over governance of mineral development 
 
92 Id. (noting that many of these early Executive withdrawals were made in the absence of statutory authorization). 
93 Nat’l Mining Assn’ v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2018). 
94 See Mark Squillace, Rethinking Public Land Use Planning, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 415, 420 (2019). 
95 Mark Squillace, The Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473, 493 (2003) 
[hereinafter Squillace, Legacy] (noting that the six Presidents who followed Roosevelt established national 
monuments “with surprising vigor”); COGGINS ET AL., supra note 52, at 25-28. Roosevelt also created a federal 
agency, the U.S. Forest Service, to manage the forest reserves in particular, and soon after its creation, the Forest 
Service expanded the reserve system by acquiring private forests and other lands pursuant to various acts of 
Congress, such as the Weeks Act of 1911, 16 U.S.C. §§ 515-521 (2018). See COGGINS ET AL., supra, at 25. 
96 John C. Ruple, The Trump Administration and Lessons Not Learned from Prior National Monument 
Modifications, 43 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2019) (quoting Act of July 5, 1884, 23 Stat. 103, 103 (1884) (in 
which Congress authorized President to determine whether lands within military reservations were “useless for 
military purposes” and nominate such lands for “disposition.”).  See also Act of Oct. 2, 1888, 25 Stat. 505, 527 
(1888) (repealed 1976), in which Congress recognized the President's power to reserve lands from settlement and 
said that “the President may at any time in his discretion by proclamation open any portion or all of the lands 
reserved by this provision to settlement under the homestead laws. 
97 Id. at 27-28. 
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also brewed offshore, as coastal states began authorizing offshore oil and gas operations, passing 
statutes that allowed prospectors to access the oil reserves of the inner continental shelf, despite 
the federal government’s claims of authority looming in the background.98 State control reaching 
three miles from shore was uncontroversial and unchallenged, though, even by the federal 
government, which recognized state claims to on these lands as nearly absolute.99 Despite the 
concession that states owned the nearshore submerged lands, momentum for transition to a new 
regime of increased federal control over the submerged lands farther from shore began building 
as early as 1937, when Interior Secretary Harold Ickes asked a member of the Senate to 
introduce legislation declaring the marginal seabed100 to be within the national domain. Coastal 
states vigorously opposed the measure, which ended quickly in defeat.101 But Ickes persisted, 
and eventually found a more receptive audience in the Executive Branch, convincing President 
Truman to file a lawsuit that ultimately induced Congress to pass OCSLA.102  
Although Congress delegated authority to the Executive Branch to make, modify, and 
revoke withdrawals, for various reasons, through the early decades of the twentieth century, 
Executive Branch withdrawals were sometimes made in the absence of an express delegation of 
authority from Congress, under the general justification that the Executive Branch possessed 
inherent power over federal public resources and federal territory, along with a direct 
responsibility to the American public to protect those resources from outright depletion.103 
Presidents also cited the compelling public interest in halting resource disposition in the absence 
 
98 See Daniel S. Miller, Offshore Federalism: Evolving Federal-State Relations in Offshore Oil and Gas 
Development, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 401, 405 (1984) (“Until 1937, state ownership of adjacent tide and submerged 
lands, to a distance of three miles from shore, was virtually unquestioned.”). 
99 Id. at 406.  
100 “The marginal sea is defined as the three-mile belt of ocean whose inner boundary is the mean high tide line.” Id. 
at 402 n.1 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2)). 
101 Id. at 407.  
102 Id. For a discussion of the enactment of OCSLA, see infra Part III. 
103 Id. at 470-71. 
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of timely congressional action. In that circumstance, as mentioned above,104 the Executive was 
sometimes the only bulwark against potentially irreversible losses of federal lands and 
resources.105  
The Executive Branch’s sometimes prolific use of withdrawal authority that was not 
delegated by statute spurred increasing questions about its scope, and whether the Executive 
Branch also possessed similar nonstatutory authority to revoke prior withdrawals. There was no 
real judicial scrutiny of these questions until the landmark Supreme Court opinion in United 
States v. Midwest Oil.106 The circumstances leading to that case began when Congress passed a 
statute in 1897 opening “all public lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils” to 
exploration and development by private parties.107 In the ensuing years, there was such an 
intense oil rush on federal lands in California that the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) warned 
that “at the rate at which oil lands in California were being patented108 by private parties, it 
would be impossible for the people of the United States to continue ownership of oil lands for 
more than a few months. After that the government will be obliged to repurchase the very oil that 
it has practically given away [in the 1897 statute].”109  The USGS advised “immediate” action to 
prevent this possibility.110 
Heeding the warning, President Taft issued a presidential proclamation withdrawing oil 
reserves in California and Wyoming, which went into effect immediately.111 The proclamation 
 
104 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
105 Id. at 471.  
106 See Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 13.  
107 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 466.  
108 Patenting is a process by which the federal government transfers title to another entity, such as a company that 
has explored for and discovered valuable mineral deposits on federal land. See Chevron Mining Inc. v. United 
States, 863 F.3d 1261, 1272 (10th Cir. 2017) (“Issuance of a patent transfers title in the underlying public land from 
the United States to the patent holder.”). 
109 Id. at 466-67 (internal quotations omitted). 
110 Id. at 467. 
111 Id. (citing Presidential Proclamation, Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5 (Sept. 27, 1905)). 
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stated that it was issued “[i]n aid of proposed legislation” and temporarily withdrew more than 
three million acres of land in California and Wyoming “from all forms of location, settlement, 
selection, filing, entry, or disposal under the mineral or nonmineral public-land laws.”112 Six 
months later, the predecessors in interest to Midwest Oil Company entered upon withdrawn 
lands in Wyoming and drilled an exploratory well, rights to which were later acquired by 
Midwest Oil.113 When the federal government filed suit against the company in federal district 
court in Wyoming, Midwest Oil’s defense included a challenge to the validity of the 
Proclamation. The company’s argument was that the President lacked authority to make an 
emergency withdrawal of the lands containing Midwest Oil’s wells.114  
Despite acknowledging the lack of an explicit statutory basis for Taft’s emergency 
withdrawal, the Court found that the national public interest in retaining the oil reserves was 
sufficient to validate the Proclamation.115 Specifically, the Court reasoned that  
when it appeared that the public interest would be served by withdrawing or 
reserving parts of the public domain, nothing was more natural than to retain what 
the government already owned. And in making such orders, which were thus 
useful to the public, no private interest was injured. For, prior to the initiation of 
some right given by law, the citizen had no enforceable interest in the public 
statute, and no private right in land which was the property of the people.116 
 
The Court found it particularly compelling that Congress had been aware of this practice of 
nonstatutory Executive withdrawals for approximately eighty years, but had done nothing to 
disturb or prevent it.117 As the Supreme Court noted, “[t]hese [executive] orders were known to 
Congress, as principal, and in not a single instance was the act of the [President] disapproved. 
 
112 Id. (quoting Presidential Proclamation, Temporary Petroleum Withdrawal No. 5 (Sept. 27, 1905)). 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 470.  
115 Id. at 472-73. 
116 Id. at 471. 
117 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 469, 472-73 (also noting the support of the Secretary of the Land Department for the 
Executive withdrawals of the late nineteenth century). 
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[Congress’s] acquiescence all the more readily operated as an implied grant of power in view of 
the fact that its exercise was not only useful to the public, but did not interfere with any vested 
right of the citizen.”118 Accordingly, the Court held that it was not unlawful for the President to 
make the withdrawals in question.119 
The legislation that Taft’s withdrawals aided was the Pickett Act, passed in 1910. That 
statute clarified the scope of the executive’s withdrawal power.120 The Pickett Act authorized the 
President, “at any time, and within his discretion, to “temporarily withdraw from settlement, 
location, sale, or entry any of the public lands … and reserve the same for water-power sites, 
irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes. . . .”121 The Act’s withdrawal 
authority did not apply to lands bearing minerals other than coal, oil, gas and phosphates, though, 
which limited its scope significantly.122 Congress did clarify that a presidential Pickett Act 
withdrawal remained “in effect until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress,”123 and required 
the Secretary of Interior to report all withdrawals to Congress.124 The statute thus conferred 
 
118 Id. at 475; see also id. at 472-73 (“Both officers, lawmakers, and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-
continued action of the Executive Department, on the presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been 
allowed to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. That presumption is . . . but the basis of a 
wise and quieting rule that, in determining the meaning of a statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be 
given to the usage itself . . . .”). 
119 Id. at 483.  
120 Ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 141-142) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 
Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976)); John F. Shepherd & Shawn T. Welch, Public Land Withdrawals: The Age-Old Struggle 
over Federal Land Management Policy Continues, 61 ROCKY MTN. MINERAL L. FOUND.-INST. 9-1 (2015) (citing 
Charles F. Wheatley, Study of Withdrawals and Reservations of Public Domain Lands (PLLRC 1969)). The Court in 
Midwest Oil noted that the Pickett Act “operated to restrict the greater [Executive] power already possessed.” 
Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 482. 
 Several years earlier, Congress had adopted the Antiquities Act of 1906, which authorizes the President to 
reserve as national monuments “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic 
or scientific interest that are situated on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government,” provided the 
reserved parcels are “confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to 
be protected.” 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)-(b). 
121 Ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847 (1910) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 
2743, 2792 (1976)). 
122 Id.  
123 Id. § 1.  
124 Id. § 3. 
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limited authority to the Executive to temporarily withdraw lands bearing coal, oil, gas, or 
phosphates, and authority to revoke such withdrawals, but it reserved to Congress the power to 
make more permanent decisions about the status of a given tract.125  
 The Midwest Oil opinion and the Pickett Act are somewhat helpful in defining the scope 
of early to mid-twentieth century Executive withdrawal authority.  In Midwest Oil, the Court 
held that the President had made multitudes of nonstatutory withdrawals, including the 
withdrawal at issue in the case, and that since Congress had not rebuked these Presidential acts, 
or curbed the Executive’s authority in any way through legislation, they were lawful.126 The 
Court’s reasoning indicated that the President was able to preserve from sale or disposition the 
lands of the American people, as “any other owner of property could under similar 
conditions.”127 Simultaneously, the Court recognized that Congress had legislative power over 
the federal lands, and that it bore a burden of sorts to assert this power when the acts of the 
Executive became untenable or controverted Congress’s will.128 At least one commentator has 
also observed that although many withdrawals made by the Executive lacked direct statutory 
authorization, “in most cases they were compatible with an existing policy reflected in 
statute.”129 Yet, the opinion left almost as many questions unanswered, such as whether the 
 
125 Id. Presidents nevertheless exercised their authority to make withdrawals under the Pickett Act “vigorously” until 
Congress repealed the Act upon the adoption of FLPMA in 1976. See 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 
14:8.  
126 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 471. 
127 Id. at 474.  The Court expounded on this owner/agent in charge theory thus:   
These rules or laws for the disposal of public land are necessarily general in their nature. 
Emergencies may occur, or conditions may so change as to require that the agent in charge 
should, in the public interest, withhold the land from sale; and while no such express authority 
has been granted, there is nothing in the nature of the power exercised which prevents Congress 
from granting it by implication just as could be done by any other owner of property under 
similar conditions. The power of the Executive, as agent in charge, to retain that property from 
sale, need not necessarily be expressed in writing. 
Id.  
128 Id.  
129 Getches, supra note 63, at 291. 
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President could revoke by executive order a congressional withdrawal,130 and whether there 
exists inherent presidential revocation authority or revocation authority that is implied within or 
accompanies explicit statutory withdrawal authority. 
The Pickett Act answered some of these remaining questions, by explicitly authorizing 
withdrawal revocations, but withdrawals were temporary to begin with anyway, and the authority 
to revoke may have been limited to a President’s own withdrawals. Thus, the Pickett Act was 
never intended as a tool for Presidents to permanently withdraw lands and resources from 
development or exploitation.131 Interestingly, though, some Pickett Act withdrawals effectively 
became permanent because they went unrevoked by a subsequent President or by 
Congress.132 Thus, executive withdrawals under the Pickett Act often ended up as “interminable” 
temporary withdrawals, even though this was never intended in the Act.133  Moreover, despite 
the Pickett Act’s attempted clarification of the scope of Executive Branch authority to make and 
revoke withdrawals, attempts to invoke nonstatutory withdrawal authority continued well into 
the twentieth century.134  
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election ushered in a particularly large wave of withdrawals, 
mostly pursuant to statutory delegations like the Antiquities Act.135  FDR used his Antiquities 
Act withdrawal authority to create eleven new national monuments, including Joshua Tree 
National Monument, Jackson Hole National Monument, and Capitol Reef National 
 
130 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 469. 
131 Getches, supra note 63, at 292-93. 
132 Shepherd & Welch, supra note 120, at 9-8; 2 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 14:10 n. 4. 
133 Id. Pickett Act withdrawals were nevertheless sometimes controversial. See United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 5 
F.2d 330 (D. Wyo. 1925), rev’d,  14 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1926) (reviewing 1915 Taft withdrawal of oil reserves 
located near Teapot Dome in Wyoming, to serve as permanent naval oil reserve, and subsequent secret executive 
order transferring authority over reserves to the Department of Interior, resulting in congressional investigation and 
forced cancellation of leases).  
134 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859, 861 (D. Wyo. 1977) (declaring that the Pickett Act did not 
“destroy” the President’s authority to make nonstatutory withdrawals).  
135 Squillace, Legacy, supra note 95, at 481-82, 494.  
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Monument.136 Many of these designations, and particularly the Jackson Hole Monument, stirred 
controversy in the affected areas and in Congress, where some members felt that Roosevelt’s use 
of the Antiquities Act authority exceeded the bounds of the statutory delegation.137  In fact, 
Congress responded to FDR’s designation of the Jackson Hole National Monument with an 
amendment to the Antiquities Act, eliminating the President’s unilateral authority to create 
national monuments in the state of Wyoming.138  Yet, Congress also ultimately affirmed some of 
FDR’s withdrawals, enveloping the lands within Jackson Hole National Monument into Grand 
Teton National Park in 1950 and, much later, creating Joshua Tree National Park from the FDR 
monument of the same name in 1994.139 
The mix of congressional and Executive Branch withdrawals and withdrawal revocations 
that had occurred by the middle of the twentieth century resulted in a management regime that 
the Supreme Court later labeled as “chaotic.”140 Part of the reason for this was that by the late 
1950s, various statutes authorized Executive Branch withdrawals to prohibit mineral 
development and other uses, and provided limited Executive Branch authority to revoke prior 
withdrawals.141 Yet, the Midwest Oil decision did not definitively resolve the question of 
whether the Executive Branch retained inherent withdrawal authority, and did not touch the 
question of inherent revocation authority. At the same time, Congress was still withdrawing 
tracts of federal lands and reserving them for public purposes, which resulted in restrictions and 
 
136 Id. FDR’s creation of Jackson Hole National Monument (which was eventually converted by Congress into 
Grand Teton National Park) was so controversial in Wyoming, and elsewhere in the west, that it spurred Congress to 
amend the Antiquities Act to prohibit the President from withdrawing lands as national monuments after 1950. Id. at 
498 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 431a, repealed by Pub. L. 113-287, § 7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272 and recodified at 54 
U.S.C. § 320301(d)). 
137 Squillace, Legacy, supra note 95, at 498, n. 136. 
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 876 (1990). 
141 Id.  
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authorizations that sometimes overlapped, making it difficult to ascertain the precise status of a 
given area of federal lands at any one point in time.142 Complicating matters further, inadequate 
records of withdrawals made it impossible to determine the scope of acceptable uses of 
individual tracts.143 Recognizing the uncertainty that this patchwork of statutes and Executive 
Branch actions created, Congress decided that it was time to clarify and rationalize the system, 
starting with the offshore submerged lands. 
 
II. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE THE CHAOS: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT AND THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY 
AND MANAGEMENT ACT  
 
Although Congress enacted OCSLA and FLPMA more than two decades apart, they 
reflect a common goal of clarifying the permissible uses of particular tracts of federal lands and 
resources and specifying the extent and nature of Executive Branch control over such 
determinations. In particular, the two laws clarified the scope of the Executive Branch’s 
authority to make withdrawals on 1.75 billion acres of submerged offshore lands (OCSLA) and 
700 million acres of onshore lands (FLPMA).144 That authority and its subsequent 
implementation determined which tracts of federal lands were available for, or off limits to, 
mineral development. Presidential and agency exercise of (and limits upon) delegated statutory 
withdrawal authority determined the range of available and prohibited uses of the affected 
federal lands, making the withdrawal process a critical determinant of the nature of federal land 
management. This Part traces the history leading to the adoption of each statute, which informed 
Congress’s decisions about the scope of the final enactments.   
 
142 Id. (noting that by 1970, “virtually all” of the public domain had been withdrawn or classified for retention).  
143 Id.  
144 G. Kevin Jones, Understanding the Debate over Congressionally Imposed Moratoria on Outer Continental Shelf 
Oil and Gas Leasing, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 117, 122 (1990); Burt, supra note 44, at   10. 
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A. Offshore Public Mineral Development and OCSLA 
 
1. The Origins of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act  
 
Before OCSLA’s passage, controversies had been brewing for decades over management 
of offshore oil reserves in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of California and in the Gulf of Mexico 
near Louisiana and Texas. In the absence of governing legislation, the federal courts were tasked 
with resolving these disputes on a case by case basis.145 California’s conflicts began in the late 
nineteenth century, when an offshore oil boom was triggered by a wildcatter’s exploratory wells 
on the beach in Santa Barbara.146  After the wells yielded “encouraging results,” others began 
cropping upon on “constructed piers…, leading to the realization that the [famous] Summerland 
oilfield extended offshore.”147 Once the technology advanced to the point that rigs could “float” 
over wells in deeper waters, around 1930, offshore drilling in the Santa Barbara Channel 
began.148 During this early boom, California claimed ownership of submerged lands extending 
out three miles from the shoreline pursuant to its state constitution, and the state passed several 
statutes authorizing oil leasing off the coast.149  
The federal government’s interest in asserting authority over the submerged lands of the 
continental shelf increased around this time, which was during the tenure of Secretary of Interior 
 
145 David W. Robertson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act’s Provisions on Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Choice 
of Law: Correcting the Fifth Circuit's Mistakes, 38 J. MAR. L. & COM. 487, 493 (2007). 
146 Amer. Oil & Gas Hist. Soc’y, “Offshore Petroleum History” (Jan. 21, 2019), https://aoghs.org/offshore-
history/offshore-oil-history/ [hereinafter Offshore Petroleum History]; see also Payton A. Wells, Choose Your Laws 
Carefully: Executive Authority to Unilaterally Withdraw the United States Outer Continental Shelf from Leasing 
Disposition, 67 DUKE L.J. 863, 906 n. 37 (2018). 
147 Offshore Petroleum History, supra note 146; see also Kristofer Thompson, Ownership Not Required: The 
Expansion of Section 167(h) in CGG Americas, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177, 178 & n.1 (2017) 
148 Offshore Petroleum History, supra note 146.   
149 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 29 (1947), supplemented sub nom. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
804 (1947) (citing CAL. CONST.1849, art. XII, § 1); Robertson, supra note 145, at 494 (noting that a California 
statute passed in 1921 “authoriz[ed] the granting of permits to California residents to prospect for oil and gas on 
blocks of land off its coast under the ocean. Subsequently, California executed numerous mineral leases authorizing 
oil and gas exploration and production in its coastal waters out to the three-mile limit.”); Thomas Curwen, A 
Historic Oil Platform off Santa Barbara Turns Into a Rusty Ghost Ship, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2019, 
https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-me-platform-holly/. 
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Harold Ickes.150 As noted above,151 Ickes’s first attempt to convince Congress to establish 
federal control of the coastal waters and submerged lands, by lobbying for a statute to declare the 
marginal seabed (the lands within the three-mile offshore band) as the property of the federal 
government, did not succeed. He was more successful in his entreaties to the Executive Branch, 
however, persuading President Truman to take up the mantle of federal sovereignty over offshore 
submerged lands in 1945.152 Truman urged his Attorney General to file suit against California, 
which he did, seeking a declaratory judgment that the federal government owned the marginal 
seabed and an injunction halting the authorization of further development of offshore oil reserves 
by the state.153 Truman simultaneously issued a Presidential Proclamation stating that it was “the 
view of the Government of the United States that [its] exercise of jurisdiction over the natural 
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf by the contiguous nation is 
reasonable and just.”154 Therefore, Truman proclaimed, “the Government of the United States 
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject 
to its jurisdiction and control.”155 
 
150 Miller, supra note 98, at 407.  
151 See supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text. 
152 Miller, supra note 98, at 407.  
153 Id. (citing Complaint for the United States in United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)).  
154 Presidential Proclamation 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Oct. 2, 1945). The Proclamation also noted that federal 
control was necessary for several additional reasons, namely that: 
the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon cooperation 
and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass 
of the coastal nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it, since these resources frequently form a seaward 
extension of a pool or deposit lying within the territory, and since self-protection compels the coastal nation 
to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the nature necessary for utilization of these 
resources. 
Id. 
155 Id.  
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When the federal government challenged the numerous leases California had issued in 
the near-shore and offshore waters of the Pacific, the Supreme Court ruled that it, and not the 
states, possessed valid title to the submerged lands within three miles of the ordinary low water 
mark.156 The Court reasoned that federal “protection and control of [the three mile offshore belt] 
has ben [sic] and is a function of national external sovereignty.”157 The Court also emphasized 
that the “[t]he three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the 
sea must be able to protect itself from dangers incident to its location.”158 Moreover, in the 
Court’s view, the national government “must have powers of dominion and regulation in the 
interest of its revenues, its health, and the security of its people from [wars] waged on or too near 
its coasts.”159  
Shortly after California began leasing submerged lands for oil exploration, interest in 
developing the offshore oil reserves of the Gulf of Mexico emerged.160 In 1911, Gulf Refining 
Company, which had used piers to support offshore drilling operations, abandoned them in favor 
of a new technology involving “a fleet of tugboats, barges, and floating pile drivers.”161 When 
this potentially far-reaching approach paid off in exponential increases in production, Gulf began 
extensive drilling operations on the bed of Caddo Lake in Louisiana.162 Three decades later, two 
companies built a freestanding drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico in fourteen feet of water 
 
156 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22-23 (1947), opinion supplemented, 332 U.S. 804 (1947). 
157 Id. at 34.  
158 Id. at 35.  
159 Id.  
160 See Robertson, supra note 145, at 494.  
161 Offshore Petroleum History, supra note 146. 
162 Id. (noting that because these Caddo Lake wells lacked a pier connection to shore, they have “frequently been 
called America’s first true offshore drilling”). 
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about a mile off the coast of Creole, Louisiana,163 and by the end of 1949, the industry had 
established forty-four individual wells in eleven oil and natural gas fields in the Gulf.164 
Spurred by the extensive and valuable offshore reserves in the Gulf Coast region, 
Louisiana and Texas both laid claim to all submerged lands within twenty-seven miles of the 
shoreline. In 1947, Texas passed a statute asserting jurisdiction from the mean low tideline to the 
edge of the continental shelf, about two hundred miles offshore.165 Meanwhile, President 
Truman’s 1945 proclamation had declared federal jurisdiction over the submerged lands of the 
entire continental shelf, including the areas claimed by Texas and Louisiana.166 When the states 
continued to issue oil leases in the Gulf, despite the President’s proclamation, the federal 
government filed separate original actions against Texas and Louisiana in the Supreme Court, 
seeking rulings similar to the one the Court had provided in the California suit.167 The Louisiana 
complaint challenged oil leases to private interests, issued pursuant to state statutes, which had 
drilled wells and paid bonuses, rent, and royalties to the state, without recognizing the federal 
government’s property rights.168 Consistent with its earlier ruling in United States v. California, 
the Supreme Court held in these twin cases that the states’ assertions of ownership and 
jurisdiction were unfounded, and that the United States had sole dominion over the ocean within 
the marginal belt and beyond, specifically including any oil reserves in that area.169 
The Court’s decisions in the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases antagonized many 
states with offshore reserves. The three losing states in particular began lobbying for a federal 
 
163 Id.  
164 Id.  
165 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 720 (1950) (citing Act of May 23, 1947, L. Texas, 50th Leg., p. 451, 
VERNON’S ANN. CIV. ST. art. 5415a). 
166 Presidential Proclamation 2667, supra note 154. 
167 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). 
168 Id. at 701.  
169 Id. at 705-06.  
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quitclaim of ownership to the states.170 To quell the controversy, Congress interceded by 
enacting the Submerged Lands Act in 1953, whose goal was to define jurisdiction and ownership 
of all offshore submerged lands.171 The Act ceded the seabed and mineral resources within three 
miles of the shoreline to the coastal states,172 a compromise that partially appeased the states that 
had chafed at the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions.173 The Act also gave Texas and Florida 
additional submerged lands and mineral resources, extending out to within nine miles of the 
states’ coastlines.174 Congress clarified that the Act did not affect federal rights in “the natural 
resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf lying seaward and outside of the area 
of lands beneath navigable waters,” so that title to those waters, lands, and resources remained 
with the federal government.175 Congress did not delineate the extent of its own claim of 
ownership for a few more months, when it enacted OCSLA. 
2. OCLSA’S Limited Delegation of Presidential Withdrawal Authority  
Congress passed OCSLA to clarify the nature and scope of federal authority over the 
submerged lands of the outer continental shelf.176 At the outset, OCSLA declares that the 
“subsoil and seabed” of the shelf “appertain to the United States and are subject to its 
jurisdiction, control, and power.”177 Yet, because development of these resources would have 
 
170 See Warren M. Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: Key to A New Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REV. 23, 
41 (1953) (describing legislative history of Submerged Lands Act and OCSLA, and noting that “the advocacy of 
these representatives of the Gulf coastal states was skillful and flexible”).  
171 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315. 
172 Id. §§ 1311-1312. 
173 Christopher, supra note 170, at 41  
174 43 U.S.C. §§ 1302(2), 1312. Texas received a marine boundary of three leagues from shore by virtue of an 
historical claim recognized upon its admission as a state in 1845. The Act recognized Florida’s marine boundary 
extending three leagues into the Gulf because of Article I of Florida’s Constitution of 1868, approved by Congress 
upon readmission during Reconstruction. United States v. Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama, & Florida, 363 
U.S. 1, 84 (1960).  
175 43 U.S.C. § 1302. 
176 Id. § 1332. 
177 Id. § 1332(1).  
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“significant impacts on coastal and non-coastal areas of the coastal states,” the statute gives 
states the opportunity to participate in federal decision-making with respect to development of 
offshore mineral and other resources.178  The primary goals of the original statute were quite 
straightforward, though—to establish federal jurisdiction and authority over the outer continental 
shelf, and authorize the development of mineral resources in the newly established federal 
waters.  
The geographic area subject to OCSLA is the band of submerged lands starting beyond 
the territorial waters of the United States (generally speaking, three miles out from the coastline) 
and extending roughly two hundred miles seaward, to the edge of the exclusive economic zone 
(EEZ) of the United States.179 One of the primary goals of the statute was to clarify the precise 
area under federal jurisdiction, which would confer regulatory power over offshore oil and gas 
development.180 OCSLA also created a leasing program for the mineral resources within this 
area, as well as allocations for establishing rights of way for pipelines and other oil and gas 
infrastructure.181 Congress appeared to “borrow heavily” from onshore statutes regulating 
mineral development in OCSLA, “suggesting strongly that Congress viewed the Outer 
Continental Shelf as a form of federal public lands, at least so far as developing these resources 
was concerned.”182  
In the 1978 amendments to the original statute, Congress expanded the original policy 
statement significantly, clarifying that “the outer Continental Shelf is a vital national resource 
 
178 Id. § 1332(4). 
179 Leske, supra note 71, at 3. 
180 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1474, 79, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1678 (noting that original purpose section was solely 
“jurisdictional”).  
181Id. at 95-1474, 86, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1685 (noting that original leasing provisions authorized leasing and 
also pipeline and infrastructure rights of way).  
182 See Robin Kundis Craig, Treating Offshore Submerged Lands as Public Lands: A Historical Perspective, 34 
PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 51, 78 (2013). 
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reserve held by the Federal Government for the public, which should be made available for 
expeditious and orderly development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is 
consistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs.”183 Congress also 
clarified that the waters above the outer continental shelf shall continue to be classed as “high 
seas,” and that accordant navigation and fishing rights were preserved.184 The 1978 amendments 
also echo many of the concerns Congress addressed in other statutes passed around that time 
concerning the importance of protecting “marine, coastal, and human environments” impacted 
by offshore activities.185  
OCSLA’s withdrawal authority is housed in section 1341, entitled “Reservation of Land 
and Rights,” which authorizes the President, “from time to time,” to “withdraw from disposition 
any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf.”186 It also provides authority to exercise 
a right of first refusal on offshore oil and gas in time of war, and reserves to the United States 
absolute federal ownership over all “fissionable materials” in the subsoil or seabed, including 
uranium.187 These provisions were part of the original statute enacted in 1953,188 as was the 
withdrawal provision in section 1341(a). The latter is not conditioned on any notice, public 
comment period, or review of any type, and does not define any of the terms it contains in any 
further detail.189 Beyond the authority to withdraw submerged lands from mineral development 
and the right of first refusal in times of war, the remaining provisions of section 1341 relate to 
 
183 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3)-(6).  
184 Id. 1332(2). 
185 Id. § 1332(6) (requiring operations to take precautions to insure against oil spills, fires, blowouts, and other 
hazards that “may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or health”). 
186 Id. 1341(a). The Supreme Court has stated that “’the title of a statute and the heading of a section’ are ‘tools 
available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529 (1947)). Thus, if there 
is ambiguity about the meaning of any portions of § 1341, the title may help to resolve it. 
187 Id. § 1341(b) & (e). 
188 Id. Id. 1341. 
189 Id.; see also id. § 1331 (containing definitions of terms used in OCSLA). 
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national security concerns, although these provisions skew towards federal retention of mineral 
rights, and they provide options for further Presidential restrictions on development activities, 
rather than the authority to revoke such prohibitions.190 Unlike FLPMA, OCSLA is silent with 
regard to Executive Branch authority to modify or revoke existing withdrawals.191  
Since OCSLA’s passage in 1953, presidents from have used its authority to withdraw 
submerged lands of the continental shelf, thereby prohibiting all mineral exploration or leasing 
activities in the withdrawn areas.192 In each withdrawal, the President enunciated a purpose of 
protecting submerged lands, and species or ecosystems dependent upon the surrounding waters, 
from the harmful effects of offshore drilling.193 Because OCSLA does not impose temporal 
limits on the President’s authority to withdraw submerged lands, many of these withdrawals 
were permanent ab initio.194  That is to say, although the text of the presidential withdrawal 
orders did not always specify that the withdrawals were permanent in nature, this was the legal 
effect of their creation.195  
When an executive withdrawal under OCSLA was not intended to be permanent, explicit 
language limiting its duration was included in the withdrawal document.  One such withdrawal 
was President George H.W. Bush’s 1990 Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Development Under OCSLA,196 which withdrew areas off the coast of California, Oregon, and 
Washington, and in the eastern portion of the Gulf of Mexico, to “allow time for additional 
studies” about the size of the reserves and to address “environmental and scientific concerns” 
 
190 Id. § 1341(b)-(f).  
191 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1027 (D. Alaska 2019). 
192 Leske, supra note 71, at 12-13.  
193 Id. at 13.  
194 Id. at 14. 
195 Id. at 13. For instance, President Eisenhower’s 1960 withdrawal creating the Key Largo Coral Reef Preserve did 
not contain a termination date, and thus was permanent. Id. 
196 Id. at 14-15.  
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that had been raised about potential drilling activities.197 President Bush specifically withdrew 
the areas off the Washington coast until 1996, or potentially longer if the studies did not 
“satisfactorily address” the enumerated concerns.198 Both Presidents Bush and Clinton issued 
orders withdrawing offshore areas under OCSLA, which included qualifying statements that the 
withdrawals were “subject to revocation.”  Nevertheless, these invocations of authority to revoke 
prior withdrawals were arguably unlawful given the lack of authority in OCSLA to revoke 
withdrawals, although the orders were never challenged in court.199  
Some executive orders pursuant to OCSLA section 1341 defied easy categorization. For 
instance, in 2008, President George W. Bush issued an executive order imposing a temporary 
“delay” on offshore drilling, preventing development that would have been allowed under prior 
withdrawals made by Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.200 However, the initial 
delay later became a permanent prohibition on drilling because of a subsequent congressional act 
that permanently withdrew the affected lands from mineral leasing and development.201 In this 
way, the initial withdrawals were in aid of pending legislation, similar to the fact pattern in 
Midwest Oil.  
The most extensive withdrawals of submerged lands under OCSLA occurred during 
President Obama’s administration.202 President Obama first withdrew an area of submerged 
lands in Bristol Bay, Alaska, in the easternmost portion of the Bering Sea, in 2010.203  In 2014, 
he expanded the 2010 withdrawal to include all of the submerged lands underlying the North 
 
197 Id at 14-15. 
198 Id. at 15.  
199 Id. at 15, 16 (quoting George W. Bush Statement on Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Program for 1992-1997 
(Aug. 4, 1992) & William J. Clinton Memorandum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer 
Continental Shelf from Leasing Disposition, 1 Pub. Papers 945 (June 12, 1998)).  
200 Id. at 17. 
201 Id. at 17; see also League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1021 n. 41. 
202 Leske, supra note 71, at 18.  
203 Id.  
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Aleutian Basin Planning Area, which encompassed all of Bristol Bay.204 In 2015 and 2016, he 
issued executive orders withdrawing further isolated sections within two different planning areas 
north of Bristol Bay, in the Norton and St. Matthew-Hall Planning Areas, thus protecting most of 
the Bering Sea coast off of Alaska from offshore drilling.205 In his final days in office in 2016, 
President Obama issued two executive orders making his largest OCSLA withdrawals, totaling 
approximately 119 million acres, which encompassed vast areas of the continental shelf in the 
North Atlantic Ocean and the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.206 
The North Atlantic order stated that the affected area was withdrawn “from disposition 
by leasing for a time period without specific expiration”207 and prohibited “consideration of 
this area for any future mineral leasing for purposes of exploration, development, or 
production,” although it did not apply to existing leases.208 President Obama’s stated rationale 
for the withdrawal was that it was consistent with the degree of “public stewardship entrusted” 
to his office, and served the purpose of protecting critical habitat areas “for marine mammals, 
deep water corals, other wildlife, and wildlife habitat, and to ensure that the unique resources 
associated with these canyons remain available for future generations.”209  
The final Obama Alaskan executive order protected submerged lands in the Chukchi 
and Beaufort Seas for marine mammal habitat, “other wildlife, … scientific research, and 
 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 19. 
206 Id. at 20.  
207 Presidential Memorandum – Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf 
from Mineral Leasing (Dec. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2016/12/20/presidential-memorandum-withdrawal-certain-areas-atlantic-coast-outer. The area included “the 
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) associated with 26 major canyons and canyon complexes offshore the Atlantic 
coast lying within areas currently designated by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management as the North Atlantic 
and Mid-Atlantic Planning Areas.” Id. 
208 Id.  
209 Id.  
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Native Alaskan subsistence use.”210 In terms similar to those found in his North Atlantic 
withdrawal order, President Obama cited the need to protect “the important, irreplaceable values 
of the Chukchi Sea and portions of the Beaufort Sea for marine mammals, other wildlife, [and] 
wildlife habitat.”211 He also identified “the vulnerability of these ecosystems to an oil spill,” 
especially in light of the “unique logistical, operational, safety, and scientific challenges and 
risks of oil extraction and spill response in these Arctic waters.”212 Like the North Atlantic 
withdrawal, the Alaskan waters withdrawal was to last “for a time period without specific 
expiration,” which would “prevent[] consideration of [the] withdrawn areas for any mineral 
leasing for purposes of exploration, development, or production.”213 
Shortly after taking office in January 2017, and consistent with his America First Energy 
Policy,214 President Trump issued Executive Order 13795, which purported to “modify” the 
December 2016 Obama withdrawals. Specifically, Executive Order 13795 proclaimed that: 
The body text in each of the memoranda of withdrawal from disposition by 
leasing of the United States Outer Continental Shelf issued on December 20, 
2016, January 27, 2015, and July 14, 2008, is modified to read, in its entirety, as 
follows: 
“Under the authority vested in me as President of the United States, 
including section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. 
1341(a), I hereby withdraw from disposition by leasing, for a time period without 
specific expiration, those areas of the Outer Continental Shelf designated as of 
July 14, 2008, as Marine Sanctuaries under the Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1431-1434, 33 U.S.C. 1401 et seq.”215 
 
 
210 Presidential Memorandum – Withdrawal of Certain Portions of U.S. Arctic Outer Continental Shelf from Mineral 
Leasing (Dec. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/12/20/presidential-
memorandum-withdrawal-certain-portions-united-states-arctic. 
211 Id.  
212 Id.  
213 Id.  
214 See supra notes 1-31 and accompanying text. 
215 Exec. Order No. 13,795, Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy Strategy, 82 Fed. Reg. 20815 (May 3, 
2017) (emphasis added). 
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Trump’s executive order styled the revocation of President Obama’s earlier withdrawal 
actions as a “modification,” rather than a revocation.216 Elsewhere in the order, however, 
President Trump did purport to “revoke” an Obama executive order concerning climate change 
resilience as a means of “streamlin[ing] existing regulatory authorities.”217 The revoked Obama 
order had withdrawn from leasing, “for a time period without specification,” areas of the outer 
continental shelf off the Alaska coast pursuant to section 1341 of OCSLA in order to further “the 
principles of responsible public stewardship entrusted to this office and [taking] due 
consideration of the importance of the withdrawn area to Alaska Native tribes, wildlife, and 
wildlife habitat, and the need for regional resiliency in the face of climate change.”218 
The 2017 Trump revocation was the first OCSLA revocation to land in court and it did 
not fare well.219  In the complaint challenging it, several environmental groups alleged first that 
section 5 of Trump’s order constituted an act “in excess of [presidential] authority under Article 
II of the U.S. Constitution and intruded on Congress's non-delegated exclusive power under the 
Property Clause, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.”220 Second, plaintiffs 
alleged that section 5’s purported modification of President Obama’s withdrawal, unsupported 
by the text of OCSLA, was an unlawful ultra vires act.221 In response, the government argued 
that “[t]he President possesses broad discretionary power under OCSLA to modify the 
withdrawal of areas from exploration or development, and he also has authority under Article II, 
which was exercised by President Truman first to claim and later to reserve the OCS as a 
 
216 Id. § 5. 
217 Id. § 4(c) (revoking Exec. Order No. 13754, Northern Bering Sea Climate Resilience, 81 Fed. Reg. 90669 (Dec. 
9, 2016)). 
218 Exec. Order No. 13754, supra note 217, § 3. 
219 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013 (D. Alaska 2019). 
220 Compl., ¶ 60, in League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 2017 WL 1736693 (D. Alaska) 
(filed May 3, 2017). 
221 Id. at ¶¶ 64-65. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678312
Draft:  Please do not cite without authors’ permission 




petroleum reserve.”222 The OCSLA argument was based upon a line of reasoning that the 
language “from time to time” in that statute rendered it ambiguous, and therefore, subject to 
interpretation by the President.223 The Article II argument was based on the fact Truman had first 
withdrawn the outer continental shelf lands from mineral development pursuant to his authority 
under Article II of the Constitution, and notwithstanding Congress’s subsequent passage of 
OCSLA in 1953, President Trump retained the authority to “undo” Truman’s withdrawal using 
the same authority that created it.224 
In its analysis of the textual argument, the court found it significant that section 1341 
“refers only to the withdrawal of lands.”225 In the court’s view, Congress “expressed one 
concept—withdrawal—and excluded the converse—revocation.”226 Moreover, the court viewed 
the statutory phrase “from time to time” as a clarification of the scope of the President’s 
withdrawal authority only; it affords a President the discretion to withdraw lands at any time and 
for discrete periods, but “does not specifically give the President the authority to revoke a prior 
withdrawal.”227  Disagreeing with the government’s position that the President is “‘the exclusive 
judge’ of determining the OCS lands subject to leasing,” the court recognized that this “power 
ultimately is vested in Congress under the Property Clause.”228 Nor did section 1341(a)’s 
authorization to make withdrawals “from time to time” clearly signify that no withdrawals are 
 
222 Fed. Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment, p. 22, in League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 
363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 2018 WL 3969624 (D. Alaska) (filed July 18, 2018) (“In Executive Order 13795, the 
President invoked the full delegated authority that Congress granted him in OCSLA, as well as his inherent 
constitutional authority under Article II.”). 
223 Id. at 23.  
224 Fed. Defs.’ Reply Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment, p. 6, in League of Conservation Voters v. 
Trump, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 2018 WL 5263320 (D. Alaska) (filed Oct. 5, 2018) (“The President's broad authority 
to revisit, reverse, and undo prior decisions of the Executive Branch is inherent in the powers of the office vested by 
the Constitution.”). 
225 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.  
226 Id. 
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 1023.  
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permanent, such that they are necessarily subject to presidential revocation.229 An alternative 
reading would give the President authority to make discrete withdrawals “at any time and for 
discrete periods of time, as well as make withdrawals that extend indefinitely into the future.”230 
Because the court characterized the statute as ambiguous, it examined the language of section 
1341 in the context of the entire statute to clarify the statutory reference to “from time to 
time.”231 
The court concluded that OCSLA’s structure indicates that Congress intended for section 
1334 to release lands for offshore mineral development and for section 1341 to serve as a 
protective mechanism, giving the President the authority to prohibit such development in specific 
locations.232 This reading gives effect to each provision of the statute, rendering none 
“inoperative or superfluous.”233 The court noted that under the Property Clause of the 
Constitution, Congress has the authority to determine in the first instance whether and which 
offshore lands shall be open to mineral leasing.234 It followed, then, that if Congress chose to 
delegate the authority to withdraw and revoke prior withdrawals to the President, that would be 
Congress’s choice to make. But the court reasoned, “Congress’s silence in Section [1341(a)] as 
to according the President revocation authority was likely purposeful; had Congress intended to 
grant the President revocation authority, it could have done so explicitly, as it had previously 
done in several (but not all) of its previously enacted uplands laws.”235 Accordingly, the court 
 
229 Id. at 1024. 
230 Id.  
231 Id.  
232 Id. at 1025. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. at 1023.  
235 Id. at 1027.  The court did not address the government’s argument regarding Article II authority, basing its ruling 
entirely upon statutory interpretation.  
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invalidated President Trump’s executive order and restored President Obama’s 2016 
withdrawals.236 
 The congressional restraint on Executive authority to “modify” or otherwise alter prior 
Executive OCSLA withdrawals becomes even clearer after a thorough review of FLPMA’s 
companion provisions.  
B. Onshore Public Mineral Development and the Development of the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act. 
  
Through much of the twentieth century, the proper locus of control over the management 
of federal lands and resources was a bone of contention, and the resulting controversies 
implicated both federalism and separation of powers concerns. The federal government and the 
coastal states laid conflicting claims of ownership to offshore resources, especially mineral 
resources. The battle over control of onshore mineral resources was waged between Congress 
and the Executive branch. The Supreme Court intervened in both, recognizing primacy of federal 
control over offshore resources located more than three miles offshore237 and endorsing implied 
presidential power to withdraw federal lands.238 These decisions failed to entirely quell the 
controversies, however, leaving it to Congress to provide clearer enunciations of the scope of 
each sovereign’s, and each branch’s, authorities. Congress answered this call with respect to 
onshore federal lands by passing FLPMA in 1976.239  
 
236 Id. at 1031. The court only invalidated § 5 of the order, which purported to “modify” the Obama withdrawals, not 
§ 4(c), which purported to “revoke” the Obama executive order on climate resilience. The plaintiffs’ complaint only 
requested invalidation of § 5, see League of Conservation v. Trump, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, at Prayer for Relief, ¶ 1, 2017 WL 1736693 (D. Alaska), so the court had no need to address the validity of § 
4(c). The court’s reasoning would have supported invalidation of § 4(c) as well. If Congress’s failure to delegate 
revocation authority to the President precluded “modification” of President Obama’s withdrawal memorandum, it 
also precluded revocation of his climate executive order and the withdrawals it made. 
237 See supra notes 165-174 and accompanying text (discussing cases resolving disputes over resources off the 
California and Gulf coasts). 
238 See supra notes 106-130 and accompanying text (discussing Midwest Oil v. United States). 
239 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1787.  
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FLPMA’s provisions affecting mineral development on the federal lands are perhaps best 
viewed within the context of the general shift in federal policy over the course of the twentieth 
century concerning management of all onshore public natural resources. As the discussion above 
indicates,240 federal natural resource management policy replaced disposal with retention and a 
greater degree of resource and land conservation starting with the first Roosevelt 
administration.241 The shift to retention was more complex for onshore than offshore resources 
due to the extensive body of existing federal legislation relating to onshore lands and natural 
resources, the private inholdings and rights in public lands (including vast mineral rights 
obtained under statutes like the General Mining Law),242 and the changing priorities of 
presidential administrations, especially with respect to mineral development on federal lands, 
between 1900 and 1976. The ad hoc nature of executive exercises of the withdrawal power 
between 1910 and 1976 resulted in “a crazyquilt of new and old withdrawals and classifications, 
many of which were overlapping and obsolete.”243 FLPMA clarified this confusion, once and for 
all.  
1. FLPMA’S Legislative History – the Public Lands Law Commission Report  
Unlike OCSLA, whose passage was compelled by tension between the coastal states and 
the federal government, FLPMA’s passage was a direct result of the recommendations provided 
in the Public Land Law Review Commission Report (PLLRC).244 Congress established the 
 
240 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
241 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, §§ 2:12-2:15. 
242 George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindberg Johnson, The Law of Public Rangeland Management II: The 
Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (1982) (“Between 1789 and 1976, the United States sold and gave 
away well over a billion acres of land.”). 
243 Coggins & Nagel, Watt, supra note 51, at 506. 
244 Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 70 (“FLPMA was designed to implement many of the 
recommendations of the PLLRC Report . . . .”); cf. Robert L. Glicksman & George Cameron Coggins, Hardrock 
Minerals, Energy Minerals and Other Resources on the Public Lands: The Evolution of Federal Natural Resources 
Law, 33 TULSA L.J. 765, 786 (1998) [hereinafter Glicksman & Coggins, Hardrock Minerals] (“Congress never 
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PLLRC as a bipartisan independent agency in 1964 to review the various federal land laws, 
which had “developed over a long period of years through a series of Acts of Congress [and] 
which [we]re not fully correlated with each other.”245 Because Congress determined that those 
laws might “be inadequate to meet the current and future needs of the American people and 
because administration of the public lands and the laws relating thereto has been divided among 
several agencies of the Federal Government,” Congress commissioned “a comprehensive review 
of those laws and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder … to determine whether and 
to what extent revisions thereof are necessary.”246 In addition, by the 1960s, interest in 
conserving natural resources had grown, prompting calls for more conservation-oriented federal 
land management policies.247  
 After six years of study, the Commission produced its iconic report, One Third of the 
Nation’s Land, in which it made numerous findings about the efficacy of existing laws and 
offered 137 specific recommendations to Congress concerning the future use and governance of 
federal lands.248 The report endorsed the fundamental principle that the federal government 
 
adopted the recommendations of the Committee bodily. Many recommendations, however, were partially enacted in 
[FLPMA].”). 
245 Pub. L. No. 88-606, § 2, 78 Stat. 902 (1964).  
246 Id,; see also Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 69 (“The absence of a coherent framework for 
administration of [the public lands] lands prompted Congress to create a Public Land Law Review Commission . . . 
in 1964.”). Immediately before Congress formed the Commission, between 1956 and 1961, the Department of 
Interior engaged in a “vigorous program of [onshore] withdrawal review,” resulting in a relatively significant 
number of revocations to previous withdrawals. PUBLIC LAND LAW REV. COMM’N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S 
LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 6 (970) [hereinafter PLLRC Report]. 
247 See Karin P. Sheldon & Pamela Baldwin, Areas of Critical Environmental Concern: FLPMA’s Unfulfilled 
Conservation Mandate, 28 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 1, 18 (2017) (“The PLLRC . . . 
supported the concepts embodied in the establishment and maintenance of the national forests, the National Park 
System, the National Wildlife Refuge System and other named conservation designations.”); Jamison E. Colburn, 
Habitat and Humanity: Public Lands Law in the Age of Ecology, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 145, 184 (2007) (concluding that 
the [PLLRC] clearly wished the multiple-use agencies would deepen their commitments to conservation”); cf. 1 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 2:18 (referring to “the pathbreaking legislative developments in the 
1960s,” which led to “the deluge of revolutionary enactments of the 1970s,” including public land management 
statutory revisions). But cf. Glicksman & Coggins, Hardrock Minerals, supra note 244, at 786 (“Many claimed at 
the time (April 1970 saw the first Earth Day, remember) that the PLLRC Report was obsolete before it was released 
because it failed to take sufficient account of the environmental enthusiasm then prominent.”). 
248 PLLRC Report, supra note 246, at ix, 1-288 (containing recommendations 1-137). 
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needed to “provid[e] responsible stewardship of the public lands and their resources,”249 which 
must include “[e]nvironmental values,” and protect these values “as major permanent elements 
of public land policy.”250 
The Commission identified many flaws in the existing structure of federal lands laws, and 
in particular attributed chaotic decision making to the lack of clarity around the powers of 
Congress and the Executive. Specifically, the Commission found that “[t]he lack of clear 
statutory direction for the use of the public lands has been the cause of problems ever since 
Congress started to provide for the retention of some of the public domain in permanent Federal 
ownership.”251 It added that the “relative roles of the Congress and the Executive in giving 
needed direction to public land policy have never been carefully defined[,]” and that the 
Executive had historically used its withdrawal authority in “an uncontrolled and haphazard 
manner.”252 To clarify federal policy, the Commission’s general recommendation was that  
[t]he policy of large scale disposal of public lands reflected by the majority of 
statutes in force today should be revised and that future disposal should be only of 
those lands that will achieve maximum benefit for the general public in non-
Federal ownership, while retaining in federal ownership those whose values must 
be preserved so that they may be used and enjoyed by all Americans.253 
 
The Commission made several recommendations concerning the Executive power to 
withdraw and revoke prior withdrawals.254 Recognizing that withdrawals were part of a larger 
planning framework that was necessary to manage uses of federal lands and natural resources, 
the Commission suggested that Congress act expeditiously to address the “urgent” need to clarify 
the power to make the initial decisions about different land uses and the parameters within which 
 
249 Id. at 7.  
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 43. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 1.  
254 Id. at 1-2. 
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those decisions could be implemented.255 The Commission found that “virtually all of the public 
domain in all fifty states” had been withdrawn from entry under one or more of the federal land 
laws, but that determining which lands had been withdrawn from specific categories of entry was 
a task that could be done only with “great difficulty.”256 In addition, the Commission found that 
“in many cases, there was hasty action” in making withdrawals, “based on preconceived 
determinations instead of being based on careful land use planning.”257 In the Commission’s 
view, these hasty and uninformed decisions had contributed to withdrawals that did not further 
any particular policy.  
The Commission therefore urged Congress to undertake an “immediate review … of all 
existing withdrawals, set asides, and classifications of public domain lands that were effected by 
Executive action” to determine whether the purposes for which those lands had been withdrawn 
was consistent with the standards identified in its report.258 It further recommended that 
Congress provide for a “careful review of 1) all Executive withdrawals and reservations and 2) 
BLM retention and disposal classifications under the Classification and Multiple-Use Act of 
1964.”259 Furthermore, the Commission concluded that “[l]arge scale limited or single use 
withdrawals of a permanent or indefinite term should be accomplished only by an act of 
Congress.”260 The Commission also recommended cabining Executive withdrawal authority by 
expressly delegating it, “with statutory guidelines to insure proper justification for proposed 
 
255 Id. at 75. 
256 Id. at 52. 
257 Id. at 1. 
258 Id. at 2; see also id. at 52.  
259 Id. at 52. Congress enacted the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986, on 
the same day as it created the PLLRC “to provide interim guidance to the BLM pending issuance of the PLLRC’s 
recommendations.” Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 69 n.401. 
260 PLLRC Report, supra note 246, at 54.  
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withdrawals, provide for public participation in their consideration and establish criteria for 
Executive action.”261 
The Commission’s recommendation to clarify or cabin Executive authority in this area 
was based upon its recognition of the “exclusive authority” conferred to Congress in the Property 
Clause.262 Acknowledging that there had been, up to that point, “conflicting views” on the 
complex relationship between Executive and congressional authority over federal lands, 
including the authority to make, modify and revoke mineral withdrawals, the Commission 
deemed it “essential” for Congress to clarify and assert its own authority under the Property 
Clause, and delegate specific authority to the Executive where Congress deemed it necessary or 
efficacious.263 It urged Congress to “establish national policy in all public land laws by 
prescribing the controlling standards, guidelines, and criteria for the exercise of authority 
delegated to executive agencies.”264 In addition, the Commission suggested that 
Congress assert its constitutional authority by enacting legislation reserving unto 
itself exclusive authority to withdraw or otherwise set aside public lands for 
specified limited purpose uses and delineating specific delegation of authority to 
the Executive as to the types of withdrawals and set asides that may be effected 
without legislative action.265 
 
The Commission specifically recommended that any authority delegated to the Executive branch 
by Congress concerning withdrawals, “should be limited and exercised only within prescribed 
statutory guidelines.”266 
 
261 Id.   
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 54; see also id. at 42 (noting the Commission’s belief “that the roles of both Congress and the 
administrative agencies must be more clearly defined so that the limits of the discretionary powers are understood by 
the administrators and the public”).  
264 Id. at 2.  
265 Id.  
266 Id. at 55.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678312
Draft:  Please do not cite without authors’ permission 




The Commission further recommended that Congress clarify the Executive Branch’s 
authority to modify or revoke prior withdrawals.267 Although Executive Branch authority already 
existed to review withdrawals, it had been exercised actively only during the period from 1956-
1961, as noted above.268 The Commission therefore called on Congress to clarify the scope and 
nature of agency authority to modify or revoke previous withdrawals in several ways.269 First, 
according to the Commission, the Secretary of Interior’s authority to “effect modifications or 
revocations” of withdrawals by an agency outside the Department should be limited.270 Existing 
authority vested “veto power” over the Secretary of Interior’s recommendations in the other 
department head.271 The Commission recommended that Congress delegate exclusive power to 
revoke or modify an earlier withdrawal to the “same officer who is given the delegated authority 
to effect withdrawals.”272 It also recommended periodic reporting by the land management 
agencies to Congress on the status of withdrawals under the jurisdiction of the various cabinet 
departments.273 Finally, the Commission recommended that Congress repeal or modify existing 
statutes that were inconsistent with the report’s recommendations, even if the report itself did not 
specifically call for such specific changes in existing law.274 
Following the submission of the Commission’s Report to Congress, six years of 
legislative negotiations occurred as Congress attempted to respond to the Commission’s 
 
267 Id. at 56.  
268 See supra notes 134-138 and accompanying text. 
269 PLLRC Report, supra note 246, at 56. 
270 Id. 
271 Id.  
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at xi (“It will be up to the Congress in framing new legislation, in those instances where an entire law would 
not be rendered obsolete, to determine whether there should be an amendment to, or replacement of, an existing law. 
The probability is that upon adoption of this Commission’s recommendations, no public land law will be left 
intact.”).  
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recommendations.275 The Commission’s support for cabining or clarifying executive withdrawal 
authority was hotly debated in the runup to adoption of FLPMA, with the Department of Interior 
weighing in to offer its perspective on the value of Executive withdrawal authority.276 
Congressional committees squabbled over matters such as the definition of a withdrawal,277 the 
length of permissible withdrawals, and whether the new statute should include authority to 
revoke prior withdrawals.278 Despite the Commission’s extensive discussion of the need to 
clarify revocation as well as withdrawal authority, the bills clarified only a few points about the 
latter, and none regarding the former. For instance, the bills clarified that the Secretary of Interior 
could not withdraw lands subject to the management authority of the Secretary of Agriculture, 
without consent.279 And it is clear from the legislative history that Congress intended for the 
“implied” executive authority to withdraw, recognized by the Court in Midwest Oil, to be 
 
275 Michael C. Blumm & Andrew B. Erickson, Federal Wild Lands Policy in the Twenty-First Century: What A 
Long, Strange Trip It’s Been, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL L. REV. 1, 32 (2014). 
276 Congressional Record, H.R. 7211 and Its Impact Upon Wildlife Refuges, Letter from Secretary of Interior Rogers 
Morton to Hon. Wayne Aspinall, Chairman, House Committee on Insular Affairs, at 6583 (June 28, 1972).   
Secretary Morton’s view was that  
The Executive withdrawal is an essential management tool to reconcile the many competing 
demands on the public domain and to preserve important public values against non-discretionary 
private appropriation: I do not contend that the Executive should have unlimited discretion in this 
area. I strongly believe that effective public land management requires mutual trust and 
cooperation between Congress and the Executive Branch. For a number of years the Department 
of the Interior has notified your Committee of all proposed withdrawals exceeding 5,000 acres. 
We have, moreover, used the withdrawal authority with restraint. In 1970, 96,924 acres were 
withdrawn while previous withdrawals on 964,961 acres were revoked.”)  
277 E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1724, at 58, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6227, 6218: 
The definition in Section 103(j) of this bill would plunge the law back into the chaotic situation at the turn 
of the century when no one knew exactly what a withdrawal meant. It would call everything from a land 
use plan, through a formal designation of use, to a traditional withdrawal, a “withdrawal.” This bears little 
or no relationship to the traditional concept of withdrawal to any Secretarial decision that a particular parcel 
of land should be used primarily for one purpose. This proposed definition represents a completely new 
concept; and if it is called a “withdrawal,” it will only engender further confusion. 
278 The first appearance of what became FLPMA’s provision conferring withdrawal, modification, and revocation 
authority was in H.R. 13777, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25 (May 13, 1976) (conferring authority to “make, modify, 
extend, or revoke withdrawals only in accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section.”). 
279 Cong. Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 94th Cong. on H.R. 13777, p. 175 (July 22, 1976). 
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revoked by the new law.280 At least one House Committee, Interior and Insular Affairs, related 
concerns about the lack of clarity between sections 1712 (related to land-use planning) and 1714 
(authorizing withdrawals, modifications, and revocations). It also noted that withdrawals which 
were “not presently considered … management decisions” under 1712 could “take on a new 
meaning” as management decisions, subject to the requirements of that section,281 but failed to 
elucidate what that “new meaning” was, or whether it believed that a management decision could 
actually qualify as a withdrawal.282 But the Conference Report on the bill, which Congress 
eventually passed into law as FLPMA, noted the lack of consensus between the House and 
Senate committees on the scope of withdrawal and revocation authority, with the House 
committees paying more attention to the need to clarify the scope of withdrawal authority than 
their Senate counterparts.283 The House Report had noted the importance of retaining within 
 
280 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 103 (1976) (“Effective on and after the date of approval of this Act, the implied 
authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from acquiescence of the Congress (U.S. 
v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459) and the 5 following statutes and parts of statutes are repealed.”) 
281 Those include reporting any management decision that excludes one or more of the principal or major uses for 
two or more years to Congress, which could then decide whether to exercise a legislative veto by concurrent 
resolution. Id. § 1712(e)(2). For further discussion of the status of FLPMA’s legislative veto provisions, see infra 
notes 309-311 and accompanying text. 
282 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 296. FLPMA defines a withdrawal, see 43 U.S.C. § 1702(j), but it does not define a 
management decision. The Supreme Court has noted that management decisions “are distinct from the [land use] 
plan itself,” without providing further guidance. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 69 (2004). The 
D.C. Circuit stated that “withdrawal revocations are themselves major management decisions” that are subject to § 
1712’s public participation requirements. Nat’l Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 322 (D.C. Cir. 1987), reh’g 
denied, 844 F.3d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Cf. Yount v. Salazar, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1241 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d sub 
nom. Nat’l Mining Ass'n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Congress favored allowing the Executive to 
continue to make land-management decisions, including public land withdrawals, even while it repealed implied and 
statutory authority to do so.”). On the other hand, FLPMA provides that “[w]ithdrawals made pursuant to section 
1714 . . . may be used in carrying out management decisions.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e)(3). One court, construing this 
language, construed management decisions “by definition [to] cover ‘mineral exploration and production.’” Pac. 
Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, 996 (D. Mont. 1981), supplemented, 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mont. 1982). 
Revocation of a withdrawal does not “carry out” a withdrawal. It does the opposite. Cf. Douglas Timber Operators, 
Inc. v. Salazar, 831 F. Supp. 2d 285, 291 (D.D.C. 2011) (referring to “making land management decisions on the 
basis of the withdrawal decision”). 
283 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1724, at 58 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6227, 6230 (noting that “the Senate bill 
contained no provisions relating to authority for withdrawals of public lands”).  
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congressional control “the integrity of the great national resource management systems . . . .”284 
Ultimately, the House’s approach prevailed.285 
2.  FLPMA’s Limited Delegation of Secretarial Withdrawal and Revocation 
Authority 
 
FLPMA’s passage in 1976 created the first organic statute for the BLM as manager of the 
federal onshore lands and mineral estate,286 although some provisions deal with other federal 
land systems.287 One of Congress’s several overarching goals in passing FLPMA was to repeal 
many of the laws governing disposal of federal lands and resources and create a new policy of 
retention. FLPMA’s very first subsection declares a policy that “the public lands be retained in 
Federal ownership, unless, as a result of the land use planning procedure provided for in this Act, 
it is determined that disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest.”288 The BLM 
must manage those lands and resources that are retained under a multiple-use, sustained yield 
management standard.289 To determine which of the authorized multiple use to authorize on 
particular public lands, FLPMA requires the Interior Secretary to “prepare and maintain on a 
continuing basis an inventory of all public lands and their resource and other values.”290  
In the first section of the statute, Congress declared that “the national interest will be best 
realized if the public lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried 
and their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process. . . .”291 To 
 
284 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1163, at 9 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6183. 
285 See infra notes 312-319 and accompanying text (describing FLPMA’s provisions concerning withdrawals and 
revocations). 
286 1 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 39, § 6:16. As used in FLPMA, the term “public lands” refers to lands 
managed by the BLM, and specifically excludes lands located on the Outer Continental Shelf. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e). 
287 E.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1769 (concerning the issuance of rights-of-way in the national forests as well as the 
public lands). 
288 Id. § 1701(a).  
289 Id. §§ 1712(c)(1), 1732(a). 
290 Id. § 1711(a).  
291 Id. § 1701(a)(2). 
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address the aftermath of more than a century of piecemeal land classifications and withdrawals, 
FLPMA requires the BLM to develop lands use plans “regardless of whether [the public lands] 
previously have been classified, withdrawn, set aside, or otherwise designated for one or more 
uses.”292 Management of the federal lands must conform to land use plans.293 Congress directed 
the BLM, “in administering public land statutes and exercising discretionary authority granted by 
them, . . . to establish comprehensive rules and regulations after considering the views of the 
general public.”294 Reflecting the resource protection and conservation ethic that drove much of 
the legislation adopted during the “environmental decade,”295 FLPMA requires that:  
the public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, 
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, 
and archeological values; [and] … where appropriate, will preserve and protect 
certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food and habitat 
for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor 
recreation and human occupancy and use.296 
 
Finally, FLPMA requires the Secretary to provide opportunities for public involvement 
including, where appropriate, public hearings, to give all interested parties the opportunity to 
provide input on planned actions or decisions.297 
To restore congressional control over the process of withdrawing federal lands, as the 
PLLRC had recommended, FLPMA repealed the implied Executive authority to make 
withdrawals recognized in Midwest Oil.298 The statute declares a policy that Congress “exercise 
its constitutional authority to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate Federal lands for 
 
292 Id. § 1712(a). See also id. § 1712(d) (stating that public land classifications in effect on the effective date of 
FLPMA would be “subject to review in the land use planning process”). 
293 Id. § 1732(a). 
294 Id. § 1701(a)(5). 
295 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 65 (8th ed. 2019). 
296 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). 
297 Id. § 1712(f). 
298 Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976); National Mining Assn., 877 F.3d at 856. 
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specified purposes and … delineate the extent to which the Executive may withdraw lands 
without legislative action.”299 As noted above,300 FLPMA provides that existing classifications 
of federal lands would be subject to review in the land use planning process, and authorizes the 
Interior Secretary to “modify or terminate any such classification consistent with such land use 
plans.”301 Section 1714 required the Secretary to review prior withdrawals in eleven western 
states to determine whether they were consistent with the statutory objectives of the laws under 
which they were withdrawn.302 The statute authorizes the Secretary to “make, modify, extend or 
revoke withdrawals,” but only as specified in section 1714.303 That proviso was clearly included 
to reassert congressional control over the process of making or revoking withdrawals, consistent 
with the explicit statutory repeal of the implied presidential withdrawal authority recognized in 
Midwest Oil some sixty years previously.304  
  The rest of section 1714 lays out a series of specific limitations on the Secretary’s 
authority to make or terminate withdrawals. Some of those are procedural in nature, including 
the requirement that the Secretary must publish a notice of the application in the Federal Register 
describing the extent to which the land is to be segregated while the Secretary considers the 
application.305 Publication of the notice has the effect of segregating the land immediately from 
the applicable public land laws, effectuating a sort of de facto withdrawal while the procedures 
are undertaken.306  
 
299 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4). 
300 See supra notes 258-260 and accompanying text. 
301 Id. § 1712(d). 
302 Id. § 1714(l). 
303 Id. § 1714(a) (also authorizing Secretary of Interior to delegate these powers, but only to officials within 
Secretary’s office who have been appointed by the President, with advice and consent of Senate). 
304 See supra notes 106-119 and accompanying text. 
305 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b). Publication is not required for emergency withdrawals. Id. § 1714(e)(2). 
306 Id.  
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 Some of the constraints are substantive. They differ depending on whether a withdrawal 
is a large-tract withdrawal, a small-tract withdrawal, or a withdrawal made for an emergency 
purpose. Congress reserved to itself the authority to make permanent withdrawals of large tracts 
(of 5,000 acres or more),307 allowing the Secretary to make unilateral withdrawals of large tracts 
only on a temporary basis for up to twenty years.308 The Secretary must notify Congress of any 
large-tract withdrawals, and the notice must, among other things, describe the parcel proposed to 
be withdrawn, explain its mineral value, identify stakeholder interests, and indicate whether any 
suitable alternative sites are available for the uses the withdrawal would displace.309 The statute 
purports to retain a legislative veto over large-tract withdrawals,310 but the Ninth Circuit held 
that this provision was unconstitutional in 2017.311  
 FLPMA authorizes the Interior Secretary, on his or her own motion or upon request by a 
department or agency head, to withdraw tracts of less than 5000 acres for whatever period 
deemed desirable for a “resource use,” for not more than twenty years for any other use 
(including administrative, facility-location, or other proprietary uses), and for not more than five 
years to preserve the tract for a specific use under congressional consideration.312 The Secretary 
may make an emergency withdrawal if he or she determines, or upon notification by an 
appropriate congressional committee, “that an emergency exists and that extraordinary measures 
must be taken to preserve values that would otherwise be lost.”313 The Secretary must notify 
 
307 See National Mining Assn., 877 F.3d at 863 (construing § 1714(c)).  
308 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c); Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 877 F.3d at 856.  
309 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(2). 
310 Id. § 1714(c)(1). 
311 National Mining Assn., 877 F.3d at 861. For thorough analysis of the constitutionality of all of FLPMA’s 
legislative veto provisions, see generally Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85. 
312 43 U.S.C. § 1714(d). 
313 Id. § 1714(e). 
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Congress when making an emergency withdrawal, which may not exceed three years and is not 
eligible for an extension.314 
FLPMA requires the Secretary to review both large-tract and small-tracts withdrawals 
with a specified period toward the end of the withdrawal period to determine whether they 
should be extended.315 Extensions must comply with statutory notification requirements and may 
be made “only if the Secretary determines that the purpose for which the withdrawal was first 
made requires the extension, and then only for a period no longer than the length of the original 
withdrawal period.”316  
Read in light of the history of withdrawals discussed above,317 Congress’ intent in 
imposing these limitations on Secretarial withdrawals becomes clearer. First, Congress intended 
to reassert its Property Clause authority over the public lands, and explicitly declare that 
Congress, not the Executive Branch, would be the sole repository of authority to permanently set 
aside large tracts of land and withdraw them from the operation of the other public land laws, 
including the mineral disposition laws. Second, the notification requirements regarding large 
tract withdrawals were designed to preclude surprise withdrawals, so that Congress could block 
those with which it disagreed.318 
FLPMA also constrains Secretarial authority to modify or revoke withdrawals, but the 
scope of that authority is less clear. For one, section 1714(j) prohibits the Secretary from 
modifying or revoking any congressional withdrawal of any national monument created by 
 
314 Id. 
315 Id. § 1714(f). 
316 Id.  
317 See supra Part 1. 
318 Given the unconstitutionality of the statutory legislative veto mechanisms, the only way for Congress to block 
Secretarial withdrawals that meet the procedural and substantive requirements of § 1714 is to enact legislation 
overturning them, and then only if the President signs the legislation or Congress is able to override a presidential 
veto. 
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presidential proclamation pursuant to the Antiquities Act, or any withdrawal that added lands to 
the National Wildlife Refuge System before FLPMA’s adoption or pursuant to the terms of 
FLPMA.319 Other sections of FLPMA also impose restraints on the Secretarial authority to 
revoke withdrawals.  One of these was analyzed in National Wildlife Federation v. Burford,320 
which involved a challenge to a large-scale revocation by President Reagan’s Interior Secretary 
of withdrawals on over 180 million acres of federal lands in seventeen states.321 The National 
Wildlife Federation (NWF) challenged Secretary Watt’s comprehensive reclassification and 
revocation program under FLPMA, NEPA, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).322 The 
district court enjoined the Secretary’s actions based on its analysis of the plaintiff’s likelihood of 
success on the merits and the great public interest at stake in the vast areas of federal lands that 
were losing protection from mineral development.323 Although the complaint alleged broadly 
that the reclassifications and revocations violated FLPMA, and the district court granted a 
preliminary injunction of the Secretary’s order, the D.C. Circuit limited its interlocutory review 
to one issue: whether the Secretary violated FLPMA’s public participation requirements by 
revoking the prior withdrawals without holding a hearing or otherwise seeking public input or 
comment.324  
To determine whether the Secretary was required to seek public comment prior to 
revoking withdrawals under section 1714(a), the court analyzed FLPMA’s purposes and section 
 
319 43 U.S.C. § 1714(j). 
320 835 F.2d 305, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The subject of withdrawals was also at the heart of the claims asserted by the 
plaintiff environmental groups in Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 890 (1990), but the Supreme Court 
limited itself to consideration of justiciability issues, holding that the groups lacked standing to sue. The Court did 
not address the merits of the legality of Interior Secretary Watt’s alleged “land withdrawal review program.” 
321 Burford, 835 F.2d at 309. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at 310.  
324 The district court had focused its analysis of the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief on the Secretary’s alleged 
noncompliance with the statutory public participation requirements. Id. at 319, 322. 
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1712 planning requirements. It focused first on section 1714’s requirement of public 
participation “in the Department’s decision making.”325 Noting that FLPMA “directs the 
Secretary to provide for public participation in ‘the preparation and execution of plans and 
programs for, and the management of, the public lands,’”326 the court concluded that withdrawal 
revocations qualify as “management” decisions.327 Because the agency had not opened its large-
scale withdrawal revocations to public comment, the court affirmed the district court’s ruling that 
the environmental groups had succeeded in showing a likelihood of success on their claim that, 
in revoking prior withdrawals, the agency violated FLPMA by failing to provide the required 
opportunity for public comment.328 
Another, more recent decision confirms that the Secretary’s withdrawal revocation 
authority is more limited than the plain text of section 1714(a) might suggest, and that a broader 
reading of the applicability of section 1714(a)’s “provisions and limitations” is the proper one. 
The issue in that case, National Mining Association v. Zinke, was whether former Secretary of 
Interior Ken Salazar violated FLPMA when he withdrew one million acres of public lands 
surrounding Grand Canyon National Park in 2012.329 A spike in the market for uranium and the 
threat of impending development of the vast uranium resource surrounding the Grand Canyon 
had created risks of increasing impairment to viewscapes within the park and potential 
contamination of area groundwater reserves.330 The Southern Paiute, Navajo, Hopi, Hualapai, 
and Havasupai tribes had requested the withdrawal to protect these values, along with “profound 
 
325 Id. at 319-20, 322 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1712(f)).  
326 Id. at 322 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1739(e)). 
327 Id.  
328 Id. at 322-23. 
329 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Zinke, 877 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2017).  
330 Id. at 868. 
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and significan[t]” cultural values in the lands surrounding the Grand Canyon.331 After 
conducting a NEPA review, consulting with several affected counties in Arizona and Utah, and 
holding public meetings in the region, Salazar formalized the large-tract withdrawal.332  
Several mining companies and local governments challenged the withdrawal as arbitrary 
and capricious and violative of FLPMA, arguing that FLPMA’s large-tract withdrawal provision 
was unconstitutional.333 The district court, however, upheld the withdrawal.334 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed, issuing an expansive opinion exploring both the Secretary’s large-tract 
withdrawal authority under FLPMA and constraints imposed on the exercise of that authority 
under the withdrawal provision’s legislative veto.335 As noted above,336 the court invalidated the 
legislative veto provision, which it severed from the large-tract withdrawal authority provision, 
thus leaving that authority intact.337 
 Further, the court described the manner in which FLPMA “eliminates the implied 
executive branch withdrawal authority recognized in Midwest Oil, and substitutes express, 
limited authority.”338 FLPMA “reserves to Congress the power to take certain land management 
actions, such as making or revoking permanent withdrawals of tracts of 5,000 acres or more … 
from mineral extractions.”339 According to the court, the statute’s delegation to the Secretary of 
the power to make withdrawals is limited to temporary large withdrawals and temporary or 
permanent smaller withdrawals.340 Therefore, the analysis went, these withdrawals must be 
 
331 Id. at 869. 
332 Id. at 859.  
333 Id. at 860. 
334 Id. at 861. 
335 43 U.S.C. § 1714(c)(1). 
336 See supra note 311 and accompanying text. 
337 Nat’l Mining Ass’n 877 F.3d at 866. 
338 Id. at 856.  
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
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consistent with the “values” expressed in FLPMA, given the statute’s definition of a 
withdrawal.341 
To identify which public values and public purposes should be maintained, the court 
referred to FLPMA’s environmental protection purpose statement:  
[T]he public lands [should] be managed in a manner that will protect the quality 
of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, 
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve 
and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food 
and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for 
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use. 342 
 
The court concluded that the Secretary acted within his discretion under section 1714(a) in 
making the large withdrawal to prevent uranium mining on the tracts at issue to protect 
viewscapes and cultural resources in the national park and to prevent potential groundwater 
contamination.343 The Ninth Circuit’s construction of section 1714(a)’s withdrawal authority, 
which the court held was limited by the “public values” and “public purpose” statements in 
sections 1701 and 1702, supports the conclusion that the modification and revocation authority is 
similarly conditioned or limited, as we develop further below.344  
     
III.  CHAOS FURTHER RESOLVED:  THE DEMISE OF THE NONSTATUTORY PRESIDENTIAL 
PRACTICE OF MAKING, MODIFYING, OR REVOKING PRIOR WITHDRAWALS AND 




341 Id. at 867.  FLPMA defines a withdrawal as the “withholding of an area . . . from settlement, sale, location, or 
entry . . . for the purpose of limiting activities under [the general land laws] in order to maintain other public values . 
. . or reserving the area for a particular public purpose . . . .”  43 U.S.C. § 1702(j). 
342 43 U.S.C. § 1701(8). 
343 877 F.3d at 868 (noting that the agency’s Record of Decision “concluded that unfettered mining presented a 
small but significant risk of dangerous groundwater contamination—a risk that would be substantially mitigated by 
the withdrawal. The final EIS supports this conclusion”). 
344 See infra Part III(B). 
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Over the years, Presidents have asserted various sources of authority both when seeking 
to protect federal lands for conservation or other purposes by withdrawing them from 
inconsistent uses and when attempting to modify or revoke the protections put in place by their 
predecessors. Some of these sources of authority have been statutory, while others have been 
nonstatutory. FLPMA repealed presidential nonstatutory withdrawal and revocation authority as 
Congress terminated its acquiescence in implied Executive Branch withdrawal authority. Instead, 
Congress put in place a carefully crafted new system of limited delegated authority.  This Part 
begins by analyzing the repeal of nonstatutory Executive withdrawal, modification, and 
revocation authority and then analyzes what remains in the limited delegations contained in 
OCSLA and FLPMA.      
A. Nonstatutory Presidential Revocations on Federal Lands: A Relic of the Past 
Presidents have invoked nonstatutory authority in support of decisions to make, modify, 
or revoke withdrawals, styled alternately as “inherent Presidential authority” and as 
Constitutional authority directly derived from Article II.  Yet, the judiciary has not recognized 
these claims as the basis for recognizing a separate form of Presidential “authority,” instead 
observing only that Congress had from time to time acquiesced in this Presidential “practice.”345  
In making the withdrawal at issue in Midwest Oil, President Taft cited Article II in support of his 
decision to withdraw the oil reserves that were being depleted for the benefit of the navy, 
consistent with his role as Commander-in-Chief of the military.346  In that case, however, the 
Court avoided ruling directly on whether Taft possessed the authority he claimed, resolving the 
case based on a recognition of the historical presidential “practice” of making withdrawals, 
 
345 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 468. 
346 Id.  
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combined with congressional acquiescence in the exercise of that practice for the previous eighty 
years.347 Midwest Oil is thus properly framed as a judicial recognition of an historical 
presidential “practice,” subject to defeasance by Congress should it cease to acquiesce in the 
practice.348  
As discussed previously, Congress did in fact cease to acquiesce in the presidential 
practice recognized in Midwest Oil when it passed OCSLA and FLPMA.349 The former 
implicitly repealed the presidential practice by making an affirmative but limited delegation of 
authority regarding presidential withdrawals of offshore lands.350 The latter expressly repealed 
the presidential practice in 1976.351 While it might have been the case that, in President 
Truman’s day, the Executive Branch could engage in the practice of withdrawing lands, 
resources, and minerals in the federal estate even in the absence of a statutory delegation of 
withdrawal authority, as recognized in Midwest Oil, OCSLA and FLPMA terminated both the 
practice and Congress’s acquiescence in it. The same is true of the Executive practice of 
nonstatutory modifications and revocations of withdrawals, as will be further discussed below.352     
OCLSA’s repeal of the practice of presidential withdrawals of offshore lands is found in 
section 1341(a). In that provision, Congress delegated explicit withdrawal authority to the 
President, in the context of a fairly extensive framework of offshore mineral development 
allowed under the new statute.353 That section of OCSLA constitutes Congress’s cessation of 
acquiescence in the presidential practice of making, modifying, or revoking offshore withdrawals 
 
347 Id. at 469.  
348 Getches, supra note 63, at 280 (noting that prior to FLPMA’s passage, “the executive’s implied nonstatutory 
authority was construed to fill all the interstices around express delegations”).  
349 See supra notes 186-191, 298-316 and accompanying text. 
350 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a). 
351 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4). 
352 See infra Part III(A).  
353 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a). 
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without congressional authorization and a replacement of the prior regime with an exclusively 
statutory one. Yet, despite this clear repudiation from Congress in OCSLA, President Trump 
invoked nonstatutory “authority” to modify (or revoke) President Obama’s OCSLA withdrawal 
in 2017.354 Trump’s argument, in the League of Conservation Voters litigation, was that since 
President Truman had invoked Article II to withdraw the submerged lands of the outer 
continental shelf in 1945, Trump could modify President Obama’s 2016 statutory withdrawal 
under OCSLA in 2017 using the same source of authority as Truman had invoked.355 
There are several flaws in this argument, though. For one, if constitutional authority to 
revoke a prior withdrawal exists, it must be derived from, and related to, the President’s role as 
Commander-in-Chief or some other Article II power.356 The President cannot revoke a 
predecessor’s withdrawals to promote purposes such as achieving “energy dominance” if those 
purposes have nothing to do with presidential powers articulated in Article II. The Supreme 
Court roundly rejected a similar argument in the famous Youngstown Sheet & Tube case in 1952, 
noting that a prior presidential action engaged in “without congressional authority” or express 
constitutional authority does not imbue a President’s ultra vires act with the imprimatur of 
constitutionality, no matter how compelling the factual circumstances in which it was carried 
out.357 
 
354 Fed. Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment, supra note 222, at pp. 2-3. 
355 Id. In support of this theory, the Trump Justice Department argued that “[s[ince first asserting jurisdiction over 
the OCS, the United States has viewed the authority to manage the mineral resources of the Shelf as stemming from 
both the Property Clause and the President’s Article II authority.” Id. at 3 (citing 1988 Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum concluding that “the President's constitutional power as the representative of the United States in 
foreign relations includes the authority to claim portions of the sea for the United States for purposes of international 
law....”). 
356 Harold J. Krent, Distinguishing Between Core and Peripheral Presidential Powers, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 553, 
554 (2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
357 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588–89 (1952). 
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Second, there is at least a plausible, if not strong, argument that even if nonstatutory 
presidential authority to make withdrawals in aid of pending legislation or for another 
compelling reason related to the President’s Constitutional role once existed, Presidents have 
never had constitutional authority to revoke withdrawals358 While there is at least arguable 
support for some degree of nonstatutory presidential authority to preserve federal lands and 
resources, supported by the facts and reasoning in Midwest Oil, there is no similar arguable 
support for nonstatutory presidential revocation authority, which would completely undermine 
the purposes that the Court relied on in recognizing withdrawal authority. In the face of a 
national crisis stemming from a shortage of oil, the Court recognized President Taft’s authority 
to withdraw public minerals to prevent the Navy from being forced to buy back federal oil at 
astronomical prices during a war. Not only was the President was essentially best suited to 
protect the public resource under threat; Congress was also on the brink of enacting a statute that 
would accomplish the same goal. Those justifications for recognizing nonstatutory presidential 
withdrawals authority would not apply to presidential efforts to dispose of federal lands and 
resources, especially if done unilaterally and unconnected to any pending legislative effort.359 
Had the Court considered the constitutional issue in Midwest Oil, it is possible that it would have 
found Taft’s withdrawal to be within his Article II powers, given the exigent circumstances 
facing the Navy, and his role as Commander-in-Chief. It is also possible, however, that the Court 
would have concluded that Presidents lack Article II authority over the federal lands, at least in 
the absence of any other presidential function such as the Commander-in-Chief powers in Article 
II that relate to the use of federal lands, and in light of the explicit allocation of federal land 
 
358 Robert J. Delahunty, Federalism Beyond the Water's Edge: State Procurement Sanctions and Foreign Affairs, 37 
Stan. J. Int’l L. 1, 49 (2001). 
359 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 468. 
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management authority to Congress in the Property Clause. Even if Presidential authority to 
specify permissible uses of federal lands may be inferred from other Article II powers, that 
authority might be limited to the making, not the modification or revocation, of withdrawals for 
the reasons illustrated in Midwest Oil. The withdrawal power was necessary in that case to 
protect federal resources during a national crisis, when the required legislative process to 
accomplish the same goal might take too long and the resource would be permanently lost or 
destroyed.360  Exercise of the power would be particularly critical for fragile or unique federal 
lands or resources that are unprotected by any statute conferring withdrawal authority whose loss 
would be permanent and irreplaceable. Recognition of nonstatutory revocation authority would 
create the very risk of irreversible resource loss that the exercise of nonstatutory withdrawal 
authority in Midwest Oil was meant to prevent.   
Even assuming the existence of inherent Executive authority to withdraw, however, the 
authority may be subject to temporal limitations. Midwest Oil recognized executive authority to 
withdraw oil lands “in aid of pending legislation.”361 In that case, a temporary withdrawal 
allowed President Taft to protect the federal government’s property in the face of crisis while 
Congress pursued legislation that would permanently secure critically important lands or 
resources. Absent both a crisis and pending legislation to address it, the argument for recognizing 
nonstatutory withdrawal authority is weaker.  
Some scholars have analyzed Presidential authority under a framework of core versus 
peripheral powers, based on the framework established by the Court in Youngstown.362 Core 
powers are those that cannot be infringed by another branch without violating the separation of 
 
360 This line of reasoning is supported by Midwest Oil, in which the Court relied on Attorney General opinions 
endorsing the President’s authority to withhold lands from sale at his discretion.  Id. at 471-72.   
361 Id. at 484 (citing Pres. Procl., Temporary Withdrawal Order No. 5 (Sept. 27, 1900)). 
362 E.g., Delahunty, supra note 358, at 49. 
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powers doctrine and infringements on these powers would be nearly per se unconstitutional. 
Peripheral powers, on the other hand, are those incidental to, or derived from, core powers. There 
is disagreement, however, about the nature of the President’s role with respect to the federal 
lands and mineral resources under this framework, complicated by the limited judicial 
exploration of this issue to date, especially by the Supreme Court. Some constitutional scholars 
label President Taft’s withdrawal of the lands in Midwest Oil as a peripheral power,363 while 
others find that the President’s role as “manager” of federal property somehow confers authority 
to prevent or allow mineral development on them.364 The source of any such authority is 
anything but obvious. The Constitution’s Property Clause vests in Congress, not the President, 
the power to establish rules governing management of the federal lands, and even under a strong 
conception of the unitary executive,365 the President could only exercise authority over those 
lands and resources which had been delegated to him or to an agency within the Executive 
Branch.366  Any presidential effort to exercise withdrawal or revocation authority that Congress 
chose not to delegate would undermine, rather than “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”367 
Moreover, a careful reading of Midwest Oil belies the contention that the President has a 
“peripheral power” to manage the federal lands by making, modifying, or revoking withdrawals.  
As noted above, the Supreme Court in that case never analyzed the President’s withdrawals 
 
363 Id.  
364 Harold J. Krent, Review of Delegation and Its Discontents, Power Without Responsibility, David Schoenbrod, 94 
COLUM. L. REV. 710, 731 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article i, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2138 (2004) (noting that the President has been “given 
broad inherent authority with respect to the management of territories”). 
365 See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, No. 19-7, 2020 WL 3492641, at *4 (U.S. June 29, 
2020) (“Under our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”). 
366 See Getches, supra note 63, at 286 (asserting that “arguments that the executive has some inherent constitutional 
authority to make withdrawals of public lands are without merit.”). 
367 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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under Article II. It avoided the constitutional question by labeling them as a “practice,” rather 
than a “power,” and one subject to repeal by Congress if it chose to cease acquiescing in that 
practice.368 Midwest Oil therefore does not support the existence of inherent Article II authority 
over federal lands either.369  
The few Attorney General opinions to address this issue also support the conclusion that 
Presidents have never had inherent authority derived from Article II to make, modify, or revoke 
withdrawals.370 As early as 1862, well prior to Midwest Oil, Attorney General Edward Bates 
opined that President Lincoln’s authority over the lands containing Fort Armstrong in Arkansas 
was “derived … not from any power over the public land inherent in his office, but from an 
express grant of power from Congress.”371 Subsequent Attorneys General reached the same 
conclusions – that the President lacks nonstatutory authority over federal lands of any kind.372 
Although OCSLA’s legislative history is scant, it is clear that Congress considered the 
scope of presidential authority in its deliberations leading to the adoption of FLPMA. Congress 
knew that it was addressing a “complex area of law” (withdrawals, modifications, and 
revocations) by passing FLPMA and decided to specify its intentions in the statutory purpose 
statement.373  FLPMA section 1701(a)(4) is explicit—FLPMA represented an “exercise of 
[Congress’s] constitutional authority to withdraw or otherwise designate or dedicate Federal 
lands for specified purposes and … [to] delineate the extent to which the Executive may 
 
368 Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 471-72. 
369 See Getches, supra note 63, at 286.  
370 Leske, supra note 71, at 32 (“absent specific authority from Congress, the executive branch is not authorized to 
return land to the public domain or rescind prior withdrawals”). 
371 Rock Island Military Reservation, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 359-60 (1862). 
372 Leske, supra note 71, at 33-34; see Glicksman, Severability, supra note 85, at 14 n. 78 & n. 80. 
373 H.R. REP. 94-1163, 52, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6226 (U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Office of Secretary) (April 28, 
1976) (noting that “[t]he draft would repeal the Pickett Act, 43 U.S.C. 141-142 (1970), and eliminate any implied 
Presidential withdrawal power” and that ”[a] cursory analysis discloses that the proposed repealer would effectively 
resurrect the very issue underlying the Midwest Oil case: how much inherent withdrawal power does the Executive 
possess constitutionally?”) 
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withdraw lands without legislative action.”374 Congress clearly intended to cease acquiescing in 
whatever Executive Branch authority that prior congressional acquiescence had created to 
withdraw federal lands (and presumably to modify or revoke withdrawals, although the drafting 
of the purpose statement is imprecise on is scope) without legislative authorization or 
approval.375 If this provision left any doubt, section 704(a) of FLPMA eliminated it by repealing 
“the implied authority of the President to make withdrawals and reservations resulting from the 
acquiescence of the Congress (U.S. v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459).”376 
 OCSLA’s purpose statement is less clear on the question of inherent Executive 
withdrawal, modification, or revocation authority, but section 1341(a)’s detailed delegation of 
authority to the Executive only to withdraw lands speaks volumes. The government’s argument 
in the League of Conservation Voters case that Article II is the source of independent revocation 
authority ignores the passage of OCSLA between Truman’s original order withdrawing the OCS, 
and President Obama’s 2016 withdrawal pursuant to OCSLA. The district court declined to 
address the constitutional question, finding that President Trump’s order was unlawful because it 
exceeded his authority under OCSLA. But allowing the President, based on alleged inherent 
constitutional authority to do the opposite of what Congress has conferred upon him in a 
statutory delegation, would essentially usurp Congress’s Property Clause authority.377 FLPMA’s 
 
374 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4) (emphasis added).  
375 See Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Price Cty., 133 U.S. 496, 504 (1890) (Congress’s assertion of Property Clause 
authority “implies an exclusion of all other authority over the property which could interfere with this right or 
obstruct its exercise.”) 
376 Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976). The same provisions repealed a long list of statutes that 
may have provided the President with the authority to make withdrawals and reservations. Thus, assuming, as 
argued above, that the President has no inherent constitutional authority to withdraw or revoke withdrawals, these 
repeals left the President with only the authority newly delegated to him or her under FLPMA § 1714. 
377 This is precisely the situation envisioned by Justice Jackson in his famous concurring opinion in Youngstown, 
where he stated that “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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repeal of nonstatutory withdrawal practices cuts even more strongly against recognition of any 
nonstatutory Executive Branch revocation authority. In the post-FLPMA era, therefore, 
Presidents can only make, modify, or revoke withdrawals using statutorily derived authority, and 
in a manner consistent with any restrictions or conditions that Congress placed upon that 
authority.  
 
 B. What Remains:  Limited Executive Branch Authority to Make, Modify or 
Revoke Withdrawals of Federal Lands Under OCSLA and FLPMA 
 
Throughout much of the nation’s history, the allocation of authority to control 
management of onshore and offshore federal lands and resources has been a bone of contention. 
The clashes involved conflicting claims of the federal and state governments and a tug of war for 
control over the uses and fate of federal lands and resources between the executive and 
legislative branches of the federal government. In adopting FLPMA and OCSLA, Congress 
clarified the respective realms of authority of the relevant actors, at least with respect to 
decisionmaking authority over uses of mineral bearing lands. This included the repeal of any 
vestiges of “inherent,” or nonstatutory, presidential authority or practices that impacted prior 
congressional or presidential withdrawals.378  Viewing these two statutes in the context of the 
history of federal land management, the constitutional provisions governing federal lands, and 
the evolution of public lands policy to accommodate changing public values sheds light on how 
Congress sought to organize and cabin Executive Branch authority in FLPMA and OCSLA, 
particularly concerning efforts to modify or revoke Executive Branch withdrawals from mineral 
development.  
 
378 See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(4); see also Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2743, 2792 (1976) (repealing implied 
presidential and statutorily delegated authority to make withdrawals and reservations). 
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The backdrop begins with the Constitution’s Property Clause,379 which gives Congress 
plenary power over the federal lands, including the power “to control their occupancy and use, to 
protect them from trespass and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may 
obtain rights in them.”380 One aspect of this power is the authority to allow or prevent mineral 
development on federal lands, including on the offshore submerged lands.381  Congress can 
delegate some or all of this Property Clause authority to the President or directly to federal 
agencies, which it has done in OCSLA, FLPMA, and other public lands statutes, such as the 
Antiquities Act.382 As the district court in the League of Conservation Voters case noted, until 
Congress delegates to the Executive Branch a power vested in it by the Constitution, its exercise 
remains the exclusive prerogative of Congress.383 When Congress passed OCSLA in 1953, and 
subsequently amended it in 1978, Congress delegated to the President only the authority to make 
withdrawals.384 It did not delegate the authority to revoke or modify prior withdrawals. 
Similarly, but with an important caveat, when Congress passed FLPMA in 1976, it reserved to 
itself the primary authority to make decisions about withdrawals, modifications, and revocations, 
delegating only specifically limited authority to make, modify, or revoke withdrawals, and then 
subjected the exercise of that authority to both substantive and procedural conditions.385 
The proponents of expansive presidential federal land management authority have argued 
that OCSLA, FLPMA, and the Antiquities Act vest in the Executive Branch statutory authority 
to modify or revoke prior statutory withdrawals, notwithstanding the limited authority these 
 
379 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
380 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
381 See Duncan Energy Co. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 50 F.3d 584, 589 (8th Cir. 1995) (concerning onshore mineral 
resources). 
382 43 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a); 1714(a); 54 U.S.C. § 32301. 
383 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. 
384 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a). 
385 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (authorizing the Interior Secretary “to make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals but only 
in accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section”); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(c) & (e).   
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statutes provide.386 The argument is based on the proposition that a statutory delegation of power 
to take an action carries with it an implied congressional delegation of power (which might be 
called statutorily derived implicit Executive authority) to undo, or revoke, that action,.387  
Assessing whether that claim is viable requires careful analysis of the delegations in the 
relevant statutes to determine whether the authority that the Trump Administration has claimed is 
outside the scope of the delegated authority, such that its exercise constitutes a usurpation of 
Congress’s Property Clause powers.388 FLPMA section 1714 limits the Secretary’s discretion to 
alter the status of a previous withdrawal in several significant ways. Whether these are the only 
limitations on Executive modification or revocation authority is not entirely clear, however. 
Section 1714(a) provides that the Secretary “is authorized to make, modify, extend, or revoke 
withdrawals. . . . only in accordance with the provisions and limitations of this section.”389 If the 
limitations on modification or revocation discussed above390 were the only ones Congress 
intended, it would have made sense in section 1714(a) for Congress to have cross-referenced 
section 1714(j) (which specifies several limits on Executive authority to make, modify, or revoke 
withdrawals) explicitly.391 Instead, it used the more open-ended language regarding “the 
provisions and limitations of this section.”392 This reference leaves open the possibility that 
 
386 John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or Reduce National Monument Designations, 35 
YALE J. ON REG. 617, 639 (2018) (arguing that “the authority to execute a discretionary government power usually 
includes the power to revoke it—unless the original grant expressly limits the power of revocation”).  
387 Id.  
388 Getches, supra note 63, at 289. Several scholars have concluded that it is. See, e.g., Carol J. Miller & Bonnie B. 
Persons, Offshore Oil Leasing: Trump Administration's Environmentally Dangerous Energy Policy, 43 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 329, 340 (2019); Ruple, supra note 96, at 24; Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling 
Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553, 592 (2018)Mark Squillace, Eric Biber, Nicholas S. Bryner & Sean B. Hecht, 
Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 58 (2017). 
389 43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (emphasis added). 
390 See supra notes 298-324 and accompanying text. 
391 Section 1714(j) provides that the Interior Secretary “shall not make, modify, or revoke” any statutory withdrawal, 
make a withdrawal which only Congress can make (such as a withdrawal to create wilderness areas or national 
parks), revoke any withdrawal that created a national monument under the Anti, or modify or Antiquities Act, or 
modify or revoke any withdrawal that add ed lands to the National Wildlife Refuge System. Id. § 1714(j). 
392 Id. § 1714(a).  
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Congress intended for one or more of the other limitations of section 1714 to apply to the 
Secretary’s authority to modify or revoke prior withdrawals.  
One interpretation of section 1714(a) is that the reference to “the provisions and 
limitations of this section” applies only to the Secretarial power to make (but not to modify or 
revoke) withdrawals. This interpretation would vest in the Secretary more unconstrained 
authority to modify or revoke than to make withdrawals. The many requirements reflected in the 
subsections referred to in section 1714(a) would apply to withdrawals.393 For example, the public 
and congressional disclosure requirements would apply to withdrawals, providing a measure of 
transparency394 But under this interpretation of section 1714, the Secretary would have nearly 
unbridled authority to modify or revoke prior withdrawals, without public notice or input, 
without any need to notify Congress, and without confining the purposes of modifications or 
withdrawals to those reflected elsewhere in section 1714(a). Under this reading of the statute, the 
Secretary would be allowed to engage in wholesale, secretive revocations of lands that had 
previously and publicly been protected for environmental reasons, or to facilitate another of the 
multiple uses that the President or the Secretary had deemed incompatible with uses such as 
mineral development. This result flies in the face of the court’s recognition of only limited 
Secretarial revocation authority in the Burford case.395 In addition, this interpretation undermines 
the statutory reference to Secretarial authority “to make, modify, extend, or revoke withdrawals” 
 
393 For example, FLPMA requires that the Secretary provide an opportunity for a public hearing before making any 
new withdrawals. Id. § 1714(h). 
394 FLPMA imposes notification and explanation requirements on the exercise of Secretarial withdrawal authority. 
See, e.g., id. § 1714(b)(1), (c)(1)-(2), (e) 
395 See infra notes 413-419 and accompanying text. 
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which immediately precedes the modifier “consistent with the provisions and limitations of this 
section.”396  
A more sensible reading of section 1714(a) is that Congress intended for the modifier 
“consistent with the provisions and limitations of this section” to apply to all of the actions that 
immediately preceded it. That interpretation would support, rather than undermine, FLPMA’s 
policy of ensuring that the public lands be managed in environmentally protective ways.397 
Moreover, construing section 1714(a) in this manner would support Congress’s goals in passing 
FLPMA of recapturing congressional authority to constrain Executive branch decisions over 
public land and resource management, consistent with the recommendations of the PLLRC 
Report.398 Thus, both the text and stated purposes of FLPMA support the conclusion that the 
“limitations” imposed throughout section 1714 were meant to apply to the Executive Branch’s 
discretionary authority the making, modification, or revocation of withdrawals. This reading of 
section 1714(a) is also consistent with the interpretation of the scope of the Executive Branch’s 
authority to revoke withdrawals provided by the Burford court.399 
OCSLA’s withdrawal provision in section 1341(a), by contrast, is narrower in scope and 
more succinct, allowing the President “from time to time, to withdraw from disposition any of 
the unleased lands of the outer continental shelf.”400 The statute does not delegate authority to 
modify or revoke withdrawals, although some have argued that a one-way delegation of 
authority to withdraw (such as the Antiquities Act authority to withdraw lands to create national 
 
396  43 U.S.C. § 1714(a) (emphasis added); see United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (noting the 
Court’s duty “to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute”).  
397 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8). 
398 See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
399 See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See supra notes 320-328 and 
accompanying text. 
400 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a). 
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monuments) contains an implied delegation of authority to also revoke the withdrawal.401  In 
defense of President Trump’s 2017 OCSLA revocation, the government argued that the reference 
in OCSLA to the authority to withdrawal “from time to time” reflects congressional intent to vest 
in the President the “power to revise action previously taken under the delegated authority.”402 
The district court in League of Conservation Voters disposed of this argument through a plain 
meaning interpretation of the delegation, however, noting that Congress “excluded … 
revocation” purposefully.403   
Both the OCSLA and FLPMA provisions concerning mineral reservations contain 
ambiguities, as the courts in both Burford and League of Conservation Voters acknowledged.404 
In both cases, the courts resolved the ambiguities by identifying restrictions on the Executive’s 
authority to engage in withdrawals and modifications or revocations thereof. They construed the 
two statutes as providing limited delegations to specify appropriate uses of federal lands, and in 
League of Conservation Voters, the court treated the limited delegation as a reservation by 
Congress of any Property Clause authority not explicitly delegated to the Executive.405 In League 
of Conservation Voters, the court concluded that the language in section 1341(a) of OCSLA 
authorizing withdrawals “from time to time” was clearly intended to modify or condition the 
President’s withdrawal authority under OCLSA, but that Congress did not state exactly how it 
meant to do so.406 The court resolved this ambiguity by examining OCSLA’s structure and 
legislative history. It noted that the statute’s primary focus in section 1341(a) is “protective,” 
 
401 Yoo & Gaziano, supra note 386.  
402 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1020. 
403 Id. at 1021.  
404 See supra notes 325, 341-342 and accompanying text. 
405 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1020 (“the authority to revoke a prior withdrawal was not 
delegated by this statute to the President and thus remains vested solely with Congress”) 
406 The title of this section, “Reservation of Land and Rights,” might shed further light on its meaning, 
demonstrating Congress’s desire to recapture its authority over the lands of the outer continental shelf. See 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (discussed supra at note 186).    
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aimed at limiting leasing activities on the outer continental shelf. Moreover, the legislative 
history indicates that when Congress intended to include revocation authority in a statute, it 
knew how to do so.407 It did not provide such authority in OCSLA. In Burford, the court 
regarded FLPMA section 1714(a)’s revocation authority as ambiguous, looked to other 
provisions of FLPMA for guidance, and concluded that section 1714 revocations were 
“management decisions” under section 1712.  That conclusion requires the Secretary presumably 
to comply with section 1712, at a minimum, whenever making, modifying, or revoking a 
withdrawal. 408 
The government argued in Burford that FLPMA only requires public participation when 
the agency promulgates new withdrawals409 or implements the statutory land use planning 
provisions,410 but not when it makes revocations. It claimed that withdrawals, modifications, and 
revocations are governed only by section 1714(a), which imposes no public participation 
requirements (even though other subsections411 of section 1714 do).412 The court of appeals was 
unpersuaded, noting that the legislative history indicated congressional intent to solicit “some 
form of public input for all decisions that may have significant impact on federal lands,” 
including revocations.413 Moreover, the court noted that “[t]he fact that Congress specifically 
mandated that a ‘hearing’ precede new withdrawals does not mean that it did not contemplate 
some form of public participation, short of a public hearing, in connection with withdrawal 
 
407 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1025-27. 
408 Section 1712 of FLPMA provides that the Interior Secretary “may issue management decisions to implement 
land use plans.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(e). Those decisions, “including but not limited to exclusions (that is, total 
elimination) of one or more of the principal or major uses made by a management decision shall remain subject to 
reconsideration, modification, and termination through revision . . . of the land use plan involved.” Id. § 1712(e)(1). 
409 43 U.S.C. § 1714(h). 
410 Id. § 1712(a), (f). 
411 Id. § 1714(b)(1), (c), (h). 
412 Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n v. Burford, 835 F.2d at 322. 
413 Id. (emphasis added). 
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revocations.”414 Further still, the court concluded that Congress intended to ensure the 
opportunity for public participation in connection with all Secretarial “management decisions,” 
and that “withdrawal revocations are themselves major management decisions.”415 In short, the 
Burford opinion points to a requirement that the Department of Interior develop a “systemic 
approach to withdrawal revocations,” involving the public from start to finish, and provides a 
basis for invalidating revocations made without these safeguards.416  
The rationale for the Burford court’s recognition of statutory limitations that derive from 
subsections of section 1714 other than section 1714(j) is not limited to FLPMA’s public 
participation requirements. It also supports the conclusion that statutory notification obligations 
also attach to Secretarial revocations. Section 1714(b) requires publication of a notice of receipt 
of an application for withdrawal by the Secretary, or of a withdrawal action proposed by the 
Secretary, in the Federal Register, giving the public notice and an opportunity to give input on 
the proposed action through the appropriate channels.417 Although section 1714(b) on its face 
pertains only to withdrawals, it is at least plausible that Congress intended to apply the 
notification requirement of section 1714(b) to modifications and revocations as well as 
withdrawals, especially given the absence of any indication in the title to that subsection limiting 
it (and the notification conditions it imposes on the Secretary) to withdrawals.418 This reading 
would also comport with the Burford court’s conclusion that section 1714(a)’s revocation 
authority is subject to FLPMA’s notification and public participation requirements.419 
 
414 Id. 
415 Burford, 835 F.2d at 322. 
416 Id. at 323. 
417 43 U.S.C. § 1714(b). 
418 See also Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234.   
419 The court explained the need for those requirements to apply to revocation authority:  
Permitting the change in status of land from retention (even if for limited purposes) to disposal 
(even if for limited purposes) raises issues and concerns that are not the same as those that might 
arise when deciding how or to whom to dispose the land. Evaluating the repercussions of opening 
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In addition to the procedural requirements discussed immediately above, the Ninth 
Circuit in National Mining Association concluded that FLPMA section 1714 is somewhat 
ambiguous even with respect to the withdrawal authority it delegates to the Secretary. Although 
the court in that case was not directly considering Executive revocation authority, the reasoning 
it used to conclude that section 1714(a) withdrawal authority must be consistent with the 
provisions of sections 1701 (enunciating FLMPA’s purposes) and 1702 (setting forth key 
statutory definitions) supports the conclusion that revocation authority is subject to the same 
requirement. Thus, for example, a Secretarial decision to revoke a withdrawal under 1714(a) 
must be consistent with the public values, and be undertaken for a public purpose, recognized by 
Congress in section 1701(8).   
In brief, the delegations in OCSLA and FLPMA are limited grants of authority to either 
the President (OCSLA) or the Secretary of Interior (FLPMA). OCSLA’s grant of authority is 
only to make withdrawals, and for only the purposes outlined in that statute OCSLA does not 
permit the exercise of implied authority to modify or revoke prior withdrawals. The delegations 
to the Interior Secretary in FLPMA are broader, in the sense that they delegate authority to 
“make, modify or revoke” withdrawals, but the statute carefully circumscribes the exercise of 
that delegated authority.  The Secretary cannot modify or revoke withdrawals of any size and for 
any reason. Secretarial decisions to make, modify and revoke withdrawals must comport with the 
size and temporal limitations outlined in section 1714(a), be undertaken for purposes consistent 
 
millions of acres to potential development entails different and graver considerations than 
judgments concerning the local impact and advisability of uses for particular parcels. The 
patchwork of provision for public comment on specific disposals cannot adequately substitute for 
public input into this important aspect of comprehensive planning. In addition, the discretionary 
nature of these public participation requirements dictates that many individual land disposal 
decisions will never be subject to meaningful public scrutiny. 
Id. at 323. 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3678312
Draft:  Please do not cite without authors’ permission 




with statutory purposes, comply with the procedural requirements of notice and opportunity to 
comment, and be consistent with the land use planning process that FLPMA created for the 
management of the federal lands managed by the Interior Department.    
CONCLUSION 
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal modifications and revocations pursuant to its 
America First Energy Plan raise important issues for which there is limited judicial precedent. In 
particular, judicial analysis of the scope of Executive branch authority to make, modify, and 
revoke withdrawals from mineral development based on authority provided by OCSLA or 
FLPMA is sparse or nonexistent. The litigation thus far over this issue in the League of 
Conservation Voters and National Mining Association cases is revealing, even if not yet 
dispositive.420 The litigation raising ultra vires challenges to President Trump’s reduction of the 
two Utah national monuments created by Presidents Clinton and Obama might shed some further 
light, by analogy, on the question of whether the power to withdraw includes or excludes the 
power to revoke a withdrawal, even though that litigation involves the Antiquities Act, not 
OCSLA or FLPMA.421  
Although President Trump may have regarded revocations of withdrawals made by 
previous administrations as a quick and effective way to open up vast new acreage to mineral 
development, the legal basis for these actions is tenuous at best.422 The Alaska district court has 
halted President Trump’s effort to reopen waters off the Alaskan and Atlantic coasts to mineral 
development that President Obama had prohibited. That forceful rebuke hearkens back to the 
 
420 The district court’s decision in League of Conservation Voters has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. League of 
Conservation Voters v. Trump, No. 19-35461 (9th Cir.). 
421 The Antiquities Act delegation of authority to withdraw qualifying objects and surrounding lands as a national 
monument is most similar to OCSLA’s one-way delegation of authority to withdraw offshore submerged lands.   
422 League of Conservation Voters, 363 F. Supp. 3d at 1031. 
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judicial responses to similar actions during the first term of the Reagan Administration in cases 
such as National Wildlife Federation v. Burford.  In response to those Reagan Administration 
actions, the courts reviewing them also halted the unlawful Executive Branch actions, finding 
them to be beyond the scope of the management authority delegated to the Executive Branch 
under FLPMA.423 Although Burford did not address the scope of presidential withdrawal 
revocation authority under FLPMA, its analysis supports recognition of significant restrictions 
on that authority.  
The Trump Administration has been determined to promote its energy dominance/energy 
first agenda on the public lands as well as on the outer continental shelf.  Most recently, in June 
2020, the Department of Interior released the final environmental impact statement and record of 
decision for the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska, opening up 82% of the 23 million acre 
reserve to drilling.424 The Department has also revoked dozens of withdrawals on the BLM 
public lands between 2017 and 2020,425 and the Forest Service has recommended cancellation of 
the Grand Canyon mineral withdrawals at issue in National Mining Association v. Zinke 
(although the agency has not yet taken meaningful action following this recommendation).426 
 
423 See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
424 Tegan Hanlon, Trump Administration Wants to Open Millions of More Acres to Oil Development on Alaska’s 
North Slope, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA (June 26, 2020), https://www.alaskapublic.org/2020/06/26/trump-
administration-wants-to-open-millions-of-more-acres-to-oil-development-on-alaskas-north-slope/. 
425 See, e.g., Public Land Order 7888, Partial Revocation of Secretarial Order dated Dec. 22, 1928, 84 Fed. Reg. 
66433 (Dec. 4, 2019) (opening 21 acres of public lands in New Mexico to mineral leasing); Public Land Order 7881, 
Partial Revocation, Jupiter Inlet Lighthouse Withdrawal, 84 Fed. Reg. 37334 (July 31, 2019) (opening 16 acres of 
submerged lands to mineral leasing); Public Land Order 7879, Partial Revocation of Public Land Orders No. 5173, 
5178, 5179, 5180, 5184, 5186 and 5187, 84 Fed. Reg. 32946 (July 10, 2019) (opening 1.1 million acres of public 
lands in Alaska to mineral leasing).  
426 Emery Cowan, Forest Service Recommends Modifying Uranium Mining Ban Near Grand Canyon, ARIZ. DAILY 
SUN, Nov. 2, 2017, https://azdailysun.com/news/local/forest-service-recommends-modifying-uranium-mining-ban-
near-grand-canyon/article_40f832ed-55ae-5c43-885c-c96fed0c1e48.html. The Commerce Department’s 
endorsement of improved access to domestic “critical mineral” resources, including uranium, on federal lands 
increases the prospects for termination of these withdrawals. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A FEDERAL STRATEGY 
TO ENSURE SECURE AND RELIABLE SUPPLIES OF CRITICAL MINERALS 37 (June 2019), 
https://www.commerce.gov/news/reports/2019/06/federal-strategy-ensure-secure-and-reliable-supplies-critical-
minerals#_ftn1; Exec. Order No. 13817, A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical 
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Thus far, the Administration’s onshore revocations have paled in comparison to its attempted 
offshore revocations, but if past is prologue, there may be more to come.  
Although the provisions of OCSLA and FLPMA bearing on withdrawals (and 
revocations) differ, courts have interpreted the provisions of both statutes in the context of the 
overarching statutory purposes and structures, as well as in light of the FLPMA’s environmental 
quality and resource protection policies, rather exclusively than through a narrow textual lens.427 
In adopting FLPMA and OCSCLA, Congress sought to reign in Executive branch authority to 
make, modify, and revoke withdrawals in light of modern federal retention and conservation 
policies. Consistent with this priority, the courts have rightly interpreted Executive Branch 
withdrawal authority more expansively than its discretion to revoke withdrawals aimed at 
protecting federal lands against destructive mineral development. The Trump Administration’s 
efforts to accelerate mineral development by reversing previous withdrawals taken to protect 
 
Minerals, § 2(a) 82 Fed. Reg. 60835 (Dec. 26, 2017) (defining a “critical mineral” as one that is “essential to the 
economic and national security of the United States”). 
FLPMA only delegates withdrawal authority to the Interior Secretary, not the Secretary of Agriculture, 
which houses the U.S. Forest Service. The BLM is responsible for minerals management in both the national forests 
and the public lands. As a result, the BLM, not the Forest Service, has the authority to make (or revoke) withdrawals 
in the national forests for the purpose of reopening those lands to mineral development. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 877 
F.3d at 878 (stating that Congress “decidedly did not confer on the Forest Service (or the Department of Agriculture) 
the power independently to open or close federal lands to mining”). FLPMA, however, conditions the Interior 
Secretary’s authority to make, modify, or revoke withdrawals on lands managed by another agency (including the 
national forest) on the consent of the Secretary of the surface management agency. 43 U.S.C. § 1714(l). According 
to the Ninth Circuit, “Congress may have included the consent requirement within FLPMA in part to ensure that 
Interior would account for significant above-ground impacts on lands managed by the Forest Service, or to forestall 
interagency squabbling concerning jurisdiction over withdrawn lands.” Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 877 F.3d at 878. Cf. S.E. 
Conf. v. Vilsack, 684 F. Supp. 2d 135, 144-45 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding that land use designations under Forest 
Service land and resource management plans are not “withdrawals,” even if their practical effect is to close the 
affected area to timber harvests). 
427 The Supreme Court has pursued a similar approach, at least on occasion, in the face of statutory ambiguity. See, 
e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it according 
to its terms. But oftentimes the meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident 
when placed in context.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Cf. County of Maui, Hawaii v. Hawaii Wildlife 
140 S. Ct. 1462 (2020) (relying on the structure and purposes of the Clean Water Act in determining when the 
statute’s prohibition on unpermitted discharges applies to discharges to groundwater). 
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environmental values and resources in the face of contrary history and precedent deserve a 
similar fate. 
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